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THE FELONY-MURDER RULE: A DOCTRINE
AT CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSROADS
Nelson E. Roth* and Scott E. Sundby**

INTRODUCTION

Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown
as great a resiliency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule
constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find
wrong with a legal doctrine: it has been described as "astonishing"
and "monstrous,"' an unsupportable "legal fiction," 2 "an unsightly
wart on the skin of the criminal law,"'3 and as an "anachronistic remnant" that has " 'no logical or practical basis for existence in modern law.'
Perhaps the most that can be said for the rule is that it
provides commentators with an extreme example that makes it easy
to illustrate the injustice of various legal propositions. 5
Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. 6 Most states have attempted to
limit the rule's potential harshness either by limiting the scope of its
operation 7 or by providing affirmative defenses. 8 Such patchwork
"4
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**
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University; J.D. 1983, Cornell Law School.
1
3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57, 65 (1883).
2 State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 442, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1977).
3 Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO LJ. 1, 4 (1973).
4 People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1980) (quoting
Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law With Recommendations, 51 Ky. LJ. 59, 82 (1962)).
5 See, e.g., Saltzman, Strict CriminalLiability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1578 (1978) (felony murder as
example of vicarious liability that "entail[s] the heaviest penalties"); G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 276-85 (1978) (felony-murder rule as a "formal test of liability"); Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the CriminalLaw, 88
YALE LJ. 1325, 1383-87 (1979) (felony murder used to illustrate problems with proof
beyond a reasonable doubt requirement).
6 Only three states no longer use the felony-murder rule. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2 commentary at 40 (Official Draft 1980). Kentucky and Hawaii have abolished
the rule by statute. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-701 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020
(1975). Michigan has eliminated the rule by judicial decision. People v. Aaron, 409
Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
7 Ohio has limited the rule's operation to involuntary manslaughter. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (Page 1982). Ohio, however, has retained the doctrine of "imputed intent," which operates similarly to the felony-murder rule by presuming that an
individual who joins another in committing a violent crime has agreed to all acts neces-
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attempts to mitigate the rule's harshness, however, have been legitimately criticized because "they do not resolve [the rule's] essential
illogic." 9 Limiting the scope of the rule's operation, for instance,
merely increases the probability that defendants convicted under
the rule are guilty of some form of homicide. Our criminal justice
system, however, does not purport to convict on the basis of a mere
probability of guilt; rather, it requires the jury to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 0 Moreover, because of difficulties of proof, the
affirmative defenses have proved to be of little practical value to defendants charged with felony murder."I The United States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule
sary to carry out the crime. See, e.g., State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062
(1976), rev'd on other grounds 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See also Taylor v. Superior Court, 3
Cal. 3d 578, 582, 477 P.2d 131, 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 177 (1970).
Commonly used restrictions include: enumerating the felonies which invoke the
rule, limiting the rule to felonies that are dangerous to life, requiring proximate causation, and downgrading the offense of felony murder. Adlerstein, Felony-Murderin the New
Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249, 251-57 (1975-76); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2 commentary at 33-36 (Official Draft 1980); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 699700, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312-16 (1980).
The Model Penal Code would establish a rebuttable presumption of recklessness
and indifference where a killing occurred during the commission of one of the enumerated felonies. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft 1980). Only New Hampshire, however, has adopted the rebuttable presumption formulation. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:I-b (1974). For a discussion of the Model Penal Code formulation, see infra
notes 147-77 and accompanying text.
8
New York's affirmative defense provision is typical, providing the defendant a
defense where he:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or
substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and
of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons;
and (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical
injury.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, North Dakota and Washington have enacted similar statutes. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2)
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT.CODE § 12.116-01.3 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (1977). An amendment to the

federal code has been proposed that would provide a broader defense, allowing the
defendant to defend on the basis that the killing was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act. S.1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess § 1601(c) (1978).
9
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 36 (Official Draft 1980).
10 Id. at 37. One court has observed that "[t]o the extent that these modifications
reduce the scope and significance of the common law doctrine, they also call into question the continued existence of the doctrine itself." People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672,
707, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 (1980).
11 Adlerstein, supra note 7, at 264, 267 (noting the difficulty of meeting all the requirements). One commentator, however, has viewed the codification of affirmative defenses as having "important symbolic value [that] should be seen as but the beginning of
law reform." Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 413, 420 (1981).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:446

which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to
law might be imposed for accidental homicide." 12
The felony-murder rule's continued vitality despite articulate
criticisms of both its rationale and its results indicate that a policy
analysis alone will not abate its use. Two constitutional doctrines
that have recently emerged from Supreme Court decisions suggest,
however, that the rule contains not only theoretical defects, but also
contravenes due process and eighth amendment protections.
In Part I, this Article will examine the two possible conceptualizations of the felony-murder rule: either the rule serves as a means
of presuming malice to find a homicide, or it constitutes a distinct
form of homicide based upon the intent to commit the underlying
felony. Depending upon which conceptualization a court adopts,
the felony-murder rule's constitutionality must be examined either
as a presumption or as a form of strict liability.
Part II will analyze the felony-murder rule as a presumptive device in the context of Supreme Court cases dealing with presumptions in criminal cases. The analysis will demonstrate that when the
felony-murder rule operates as a presumption, it conclusively shifts
the burden of proof to the defendant, thereby violating the due process guarantees articulated by the Court in cases beginning with In
re Winship t3 and most recently expanded upon in Sandstrom v.
4
Montana. 1
Part III will examine the alternative explanation of the felonymurder rule, that it constitutes a distinct form of homicide, in light
of Supreme Court cases requiring proof of mens rea for each element of serious, nonregulatory crimes. Under this conceptualization, the felony-murder rule runs afoul of both eighth amendment
and due process guarantees.
Previous constitutional attacks on the felony-murder rule have
been few' 5 and have challenged the constitutionality of only one
conceptualization of the rule, allowing the court to avoid the constitutional issue merely by adopting the alternative conceptualization.
These prior constitutional challenges may have failed in part because they generally preceded recent Supreme Court cases in the
12 Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 5, at 1383. England, where the doctrine
originated, abolished the felony-murder rule in 1957. The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6
Eliz. 2, ch. 11 § 1. The rule apparently never existed in France or Germany. Fletcher,
supra note 11, at 415.
13
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
14
442 U.S. 510 (1979).
15 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 425. Professor Fletcher raises the possibility of equal
protection and sixth amendment problems with the felony-murder rule, but does not
raise the arguments presented in this article. Id.
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due process and eighth amendment areas. 16
The analysis developed in this Article, in contrast, does not allow a conceptual escape route. If a court chooses to characterize the
felony-murder rule as a presumption, it must confront the due process questions raised by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant and usurping the jury function. If the court rejects the
presumption conceptualization, it must then face the constitutional
infirmities of imposing strict liability for a serious, nonregulatory
crime. Therefore, under either approach a court must articulate the
rule's rationale and attempt to justify it from both policy and constitutional perspectives. The Article also explores recent developments in the use of presumptions in criminal cases and the
restrictions on strict liability crimes.
I
THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE FELONY-MURDER RULE

A.

The Rule's Historical Development

The origins of the felony-murder rule are disputed. Some commentators contend that the rule was first used in a sixteenth century
case to attribute malice to an individual for the murderous act of a
co-felon. 17 Others trace the founding of the rule to a "blunder" by
Lord Coke in extrapolating a statement by Bracton on unlawful killing into a basis for finding murder from the commission of a felony.' 8 Professor Fletcher offers yet a third view, which finds the
origins of the rule in Foster's discussion of transferred felonious intent in Discourse of Homicide, 19 with only a "nominal link" to Coke,
20
Hale, and Hawkins.
16 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of the felony-murder rule. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978), ChiefJustice Burger,
joined by three other Justices, stated: "That states have authority to make aiders and
abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with principles, or to enact felony-murder statutes is beyond constitutional challenge." ChiefJustice Burger's dicta, however,
was undermined in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), where the Court held that
imposing the death penalty on a nontriggerman for felony murder violated the eighth
amendment. See infra notes 180-212 and accompanying text.
17 Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50,
58 (1956). Morris cites Lord Dacre's case, Moore 86, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535), for
this proposition.
18 See Recent Development, CriminalLaw: Felony-Murder Rule-Felon's Responsibility
for Death of Accomplice, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1496, 1496 n.2 (1965).
19 M. FOSTER, DISCOURSE OF HOMICIDE 258 (1762).
20 G. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 278-83. According to Fletcher, Foster's theory of
"transferred felonious intent" was expounded upon by Blackstone and East into the
felony-murder rule later adopted by American legislatures. Id. at 283. Fletcher sees
Coke, Hale, and Hawkins as concerned with the excuse of per infortunium for unlawful
acts, and not with the idea of underlying felonious intent as a basis for murder. Id. at
278-82.
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The purpose of the felony-murder rule at common law is also
vague. It is frequently argued that the rule's purpose was not fully
articulated because all felonies at common law were punished by
death and, therefore, the rule had little practical impact. 2 1 Further
research has revealed, however, that execution rates varied widely
according to the felony. 2 2 One suggested purpose is that the rule
served as a means of more severely punishing incomplete or attempted felonies, which were only misdemeanors at common law, if
a killing occurred. The rule thus enabled the courts to impose the
same punishment as if the felony had succeeded. 23 This purpose, of
course, has little relevance in modern criminal justice systems,
which recognize attempted felonies as serious punishable crimes.
Whatever the felony-murder rule's justification at common law,
courts have attempted to provide the rule with a contemporary rationale. These post hoc rationalizations fall into four general categories: deterrence, transferred intent, retribution, and general
culpability.
B.

Deterrence

The deterrence rationale consists of two different strains. The
first approach views the felony-murder rule as a doctrine intended
to deter negligent and accidental killings during commission of felonies. 24 Proponents argue that co-felons will dissuade each other
from the use of violence if they may be liable for murder. 2 5 Justice
Holmes attempted to justify the rule on this basis by arguing that
the rule would be justified if experience showed that death resulted
disproportionately from the commission of felonies. 2 6 Holmes ad§ 210.2 commentary at 31 n.74 (Official Draft 1980); 3 J.
supra note 1, at 75-76. The use of the death penalty in England for a wide
variety of crimes has been attributed to the inadequacy of law enforcement at the time,
making severe punishments necessary as a deterrent. Molnar, Criminal Law Revision in
21

MODEL PENAL CODE

STEPHEN,

Georgia, 15 MERCER L. REV. 399, 400 (1964).
22
1 L. RADZINOWICZ, HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL Law 155 (1948) (noting that

in 1810, 60% of convicted murders were executed, compared to only 15% of those
convicted for robbery). Fletcher characterizes the argument that the felony-murder rule
had no great impact because all felonies were capital crimes as "an example where arguing from the law on the books, rather than the practice of the courts, can easily lead us
astray. It simply false to say that it made no difference whether one was convicted of
larceny or of murder .... " Fletcher, supra note 5, at 283.
23

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 31 n.74 (Official Draft 1980).

24 Note, State v. Jackson: A Solution to the Felony-Murder Rule Dilemma, 9 N.M. L. REV.
433, 440 (1979). See also People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781,402 P.2d 130, 133,
44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) ("purpose of felony-murder rule is to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they
commit").
25 Adlerstein, supra note 7, at 250.
26 Still the law is intelligible as it stands. ...
Now, if experience shows, or is deemed by the law-maker to show, that
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ded the caveat that "I do not.

.

., however, mean to argue that the

rules under discussion arose on the above reasoning, any more than
' 27
that they are right, or would be generally applied in this country."
The second view focuses not on the killing, but on the felony
itself, and endorses the felony-murder rule as a deterrent to dangerous felonies. 28 From this perspective, punishing both accidental
and deliberate killings that result from the commission of a felony is
"the strongest possible deterrent" to "undertaking inherently dan'2 9
gerous felonies."
Both of the deterrence justifications are logically flawed and
neither has proven to have a basis in fact. The illogic of the felonymurder rule as a means of deterring killing is apparent when applied
to accidental killings occurring during the commission of a felony.
Quite simply, how does one deter an unintended act?3 0 A similar
deterrence problem arises when the felony-murder rule is used to
convict the defendant for murder when a third party, such as the
victim or a policeman, committed the killing. The defendant has no
control over the acts of the third party and thus the rule cannot deter this sort of killing.3 ' Moreover, any potential deterrence effect
on unintentional killings is further reduced because few felons
either will know that the felony-murder rule imposes strict liability
somehow or other deaths which the evidence makes accidental happen
disproportionately often in connection with other felonies, or with resistance to officers, or if on any other ground of policy it is deemed desirable
to make special efforts for the prevention of such deaths, the law-maker
may consistently treat acts which, under the known circumstances, are
felonious, or constitute resistance to officers, as having a sufficiently dangerous tendency to be put under a special ban. The law may, therefore,
throw on the actor the peril, not only of the consequences forseen by
him, but also of consequences which, although not predicted by common
experience, the legislator apprehends.
See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 58-59 (1881).

Id. at 59.
See People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 790, 402 P.2d 130, 139, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442, 451 (1965) (Burke, J., dissenting) (purpose of felony-murder rule is to deter felons
from undertaking inherently dangerous felonies). This proposed basis of the felonymurder rule is apparently the minority view. See Note, The MergerDoctrine as a Limitation
on the Felony-Murder Rule: A Balance of CriminalLaw Principles, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
369, 374 (1977) ("[Mlost jurisdictions have characterized the purpose [of the Rule) to
be not the deterrence of the underlying felony itself, but the deterrence of negligent or
accidental killing during the perpetration of a felony.").
29 People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d at 790-91,402 P.2d at 139, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444
(Burke, J., dissenting).
30
Comment, Merger and the Felony-Murder Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 250, 258-59
n.41 (1972) (noting that it is difficult to see how felony-murder rule could deter accidental homicide).
31
Note, The Constitutionalityof Imposing the Death Penaltyfor Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L.
REv. 356, 377 (1978) (no deterrent possible if victim or police commit homicide); see
also, Note, supra note 24, at 440.
27
28
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for resulting deaths3 2 or will believe that harm will result from commission of the felony.3 3 Finally, statistical evidence has not borne
that a disproportionate number
out Holmes's proposed justification
34
of killings occur during felonies.
The purpose of deterring the commission of dangerous felonies
through the felony-murder rule also lacks a legitimate basis. First,
considerable doubt exists that serious crimes are deterred by varying the weight of the punishment. 35 Second, the rule from this perspective uses the sanctions for murder to deter felonies, and "it is
usually accepted as wiser to strike at the harm intended by the criminal rather than at the greater harm possibly flowing from his act
which was neither intended nor desired by him." 3 6 Where the killing is unintended, it would be far more sensible to enhance the sentence for conduct over which the felon had control, such as the
carrying of a deadly weapon, rather than automatically to elevate the
killing to murder. Finally, as with the other deterrence rationale,
the felony-murder rule can have no deterrent effect if the felon
either does not know how the rule works or does not believe a kill37
ing will actually result.
The deterrence rationale, no matter how formulated, thus provides little justification for the felony-murder rule. The rule's scope
encompasses situations, such as an accidental killing, where no deterrence is possible. The lack of a deterrent effect because the defendant does not have killing as an objective also highlights the
felony-murder rule's potential to punish a defendant who had no
subjective culpability. Yet, the punishment of a killing as murder
where subjective culpability is lacking clashes with modern definitions of murder. The Model Penal Code, for example, requires
some degree of subjective culpability for a killing to be classified as
murder: either a purposeful 38 or knowing 3 9 killing, or a killing re32
Id. at 376-78 (felon is not likely to know that if homicide results from felony, state
will be relieved of burden of proving premeditation and malice aforethought).
Note, supra note 31, at 377 (due to small percentage of felonies in which death
33
occurs, felon assumes homicide will not result during his felony).
34
For instance, only one-half of one percent of all robberies result in homicide.
The statistical data is summarized in Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 799-800 nn. 2324 (1982).
35 Morris, supra note 17, at 67 (theory of deterrence of serious crimes by harsher
punishments is greatly in doubt).
36 Id.; see also People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) ("It is contended. . . that another purpose of the felony-murder
rule is to prevent the commission of robberies. Neither the common law rationale of the
rule nor the Penal Code supports this contention.").
37 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
38 The Model Penal Code defines "purposefully" in terms of having as a "conscious
object" the prohibited conduct or result. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed
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sulting from extreme recklessness. 40 Negligent homicide, in contrast, is treated as a lesser felony, and accidental homicide is not
41
classified as a felony at all.
C.

Transferred Intent and Constructive Malice: The FelonyMurder Rule's Presumption of Culpability

The felony-murder rule may be conceptualized as a theory of
"transferred or constructive intent. '4 2 This theory posits that the
intent to commit the felony is "transferred" to the act of killing in
order to find culpability for the homicide. The rule thus serves "the
purpose of. . . reliev[ing] the state of the burden of proving pre43
meditation or malice."
Judges and commentators have criticized the transferred intent
theory of felony murder as "an anachronistic remnant" 4 4 that oper46
ates "fictitiously" 4 5 to broaden unacceptably the scope of murder.
Official Draft 1962). Section 210.2(1)(a) defines murder as purposefully committed
homicide.
39
Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts "knowingly" if he is aware that the
prohibited conduct or attendant circumstance exists, or if he is "aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause [the prohibited] result." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
40
Reckless behavior under the Model Penal Code involves both subjective and objective elements. The actor must "consciously disregard. . . a substantial and unjustifiable risk," and such disregard must constitute a "gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Id.
§ 2.02(2)(c).
The Code's emphasis on culpability is reflected in its treatment of reckless homicide. Reckless homicide constitutes manslaughter, a felony of the second degree.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a), (2) (Official Draft 1980). To constitute murder, one
not only must act recklessly, but also "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id. § 210.2(1)(b). The added element of "extreme
indifference" thus highlights the subjective element of "conscious disregard"-the more
egregious the circumstances that the actor is ignoring, the greater his culpability.
41
Negligence under the Model Penal Code is an objective standard: "A person
acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The standard is different, however, from tort negligence, because the Model Penal Code
requires "a gross deviation from the standard of care." Id. The Code's general disapproval of defining criminal activity where a subjective mental state is not involved is
evident in § 2.02(3), which provides that the culpability required for a material element
of a crime, if not stated, is purposeful, knowing or reckless conduct. Negligent homicide
is punished as a felony of the third degree. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (Official Draft
1980).
42
State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980).
43 Comment, An Assault Resulting in Homicide may be Used to Invoke the Felony-Murder
Rule, 13 GoNz. L. REV. 268, 271 (1977).
44
Note, Recent Extensions of Felony-Murder Rule, 31 IND. L.J. 534, 535 (1956).
45
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 413.
46
People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 714, 299 N.W.2d 304, 319 (1980); see also Recent Development, supra note 18, at 1500 (felony-murder rule is "artificial construction
of mens rea"); Note, Felony Murder As a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66

454

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:446

The very concept of transferred intent has been criticized as having
"no proper place in criminal law."' 4 7
More fundamentally, the theory simply does not apply to felony
murder. Stated in its classic form, the transferred intent theory applies where "if A by malice aforethought strikes at B and missing
him strikes C whereof he dies, though he never bore any malice to C
yet it is murder, and the law transfers the malice to the party
slain." 4 8 Such a result is justified because "[t]he general mental pattern is the same whether the malicious endeavor was to kill B or to
kill C." '4 9 Just as firmly entrenched in the law, however, is the principle that "where the state of mind which prompted the action does
not constitute the particular mens rea required by law for the offense
charged," 50 the doctrine of transferred intent is inapplicable. 5 '
The inapplicability of transferred intent to felony murder becomes evident when the crime's two different mens rea elements are
examined: the intent to commit the felony and the culpability for
the killing. The mental patterns are thus distinct and separate; for
example, the intent to burglarize cannot be equated with the malice
aforethought required for murder. 52 The non-transferability of culYALE LJ. 427, 432 (1947) (felony murder broadens scope of first degree murder by
supplying proof of mental state in law that may not exist in fact).
47
48

R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 921 (1982).
1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 466.

R. PERKINS, supra note 47, at 922.
Id. at 923.
51 See, e.g., Regina v. Pembliton, 2 L.R.-Cr. Gas. Res. 119, 12 Cox C.C. 607 (1874)
(defendant intentionally throwing stone at people but breaking window accidentally did
not have proper mens rea for charge of malicious injury to property); Regina v. Faulkner, 1877 Ir. R. 8, 13 Cox C.C. 550 (Ireland 1877) (sailor intending to steal rum but
accidentally setting ship on fire did not have proper mens rea for charge of maliciously
setting ship on fire). See also R. PERKINS, supra note 47, at 923 (where felon's state of
mind does not constitute particular mens rea required by law for offense charged, the
courts repudiate the notion of transferred intent).
52 G. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 282. ("There is no authority whatever for the principle that any felonious intent is sufficient to constitute malice aforethought.").
As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress amended the
federal felony-murder rule to also include killings occurring during the commission of
"escape, murder, kidnaping, treason, espionage, sabotage," Comprehensive Crime
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1004, 98 Stat. 1976, 2138 (1984); the federal rule
had previously only included the offenses of "arson, rape, burglary, or robbery." 18
U.S.C. § 1111 (1982).
The Senate Judiciary Committee's explanation for including murder aptly demonstrates the inapplicability of the transferred intent theory to felony murder:
Murder is included in the list to cover a situation in which the defendant
acts in the heat of passion in an attempt to kill A, but instead kills B. The
Committee believes that the danger to innocent persons presented in this
type of situation is so severe that the defendant should be charged with
first degree murder even though if he had killed A he could only be
charged with second degree murder.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 311, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 310. In the Committee's example, the defendant's subjective culpability for the
49
50
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pability is even more evident where the felony-murder rule allows
elevation of the killing to first degree murder. 5 3 In such a situation,
the rule equates the intent to commit the felony with premeditation
and deliberation, specific mental states that require proof of particu54
lar acts and thoughts.
"Constructive malice" is closely related to the concept of transferred intent and is also frequently used to describe the operation of
the felony-murder rule.5 5 Neither the literature nor the case law
clearly articulates the distinction between transferred intent and
constructive malice. Of course, if the distinction rests only on semantics, then the fallacies of using the transferred intent theory to
explain felony murder would apply equally to constructive malice.
Constructive malice, however, appears to be more akin to the
legal concept of a presumption. Whereas transferred intent would
allow the mental state required for Act A to substitute for the mental
state required for Act B, constructive malice would "impute" or presume the mental state required for Act B from the commission of
requisite felony offense, second degree murder, by admission does not correlate with
the mens rea required for first degree murder if felony murder is not involved. 18
U.S.C. § 1111 ("willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated"). The lack of correlation becomes even more evident when the felony offense involved does not involve contemplation of the taking of a human life.
53 Certain states interpret their felony-murder rules as requiring that malice aforethought be proved, but permit the rule to elevate the murder to first degree murder
without proof of deliberation or premeditation. The rule is thus seen as "merely a particular statutorily prescribed method for showing the mental elements of deliberation
and premeditation." State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 270 (Iowa 1979).
Iowa's recent history with the felony-murder rule highlights the struggle to conceptualize felony murder. In State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596 (Iowa 1976), the Iowa
Supreme Court held that the felony-murder rule as incorporated by statute served only
to elevate killings in the perpetration of designated felonies to first degree murder. Id.
at 604. Malice aforethought, therefore, still had to be shown to find murder. Id.; see also,
State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1979) (effect of Iowa's statute is to make
murders which occur in perpetration of named felonies first-degree murder). In a later
case, however, the court held that "[m]alice. . . may be implied from the commission of
a felony which results in death." State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1980).
The Iowa Supreme Court thus employs a formalistic approach: it makes a showing of
malice aforethought a prerequisite for murder in every case, but allows the use of the
felony-murder rule to show such malice, as well as the deliberation and premeditation
required for first degree murder.
54 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1968). The Anderson court outlined three factors to consider in finding premeditation
and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and the manner of the killing. The court
noted that "the legislative classification of murder into two degrees would be meaningless if 'deliberation' and 'premeditation' were construed as requiring no more reflection
than . . . the mere formation of a specific intent to kill." Id. at 26. The irony of using
felony murder to elevate a killing to first degree murder is that felony murder may not
even involve the specific intent to kill required to find second degree murder. See Note,
supra note 46, at 432 ("felony murder broadens the scope of first degree murder by
supplying proof of a mental state in law that may not exist in fact").
55 See, e.g., State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980).
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Act A. 56 The felony-murder rule thus acts as a "mens rea-imposing
57
mechanism."
As a form of constructive malice, the felony-murder rule is
viewed as conclusively presuming homicidal mens rea from the commission of the felony. 5 8 This approach allows the courts to avoid
characterizing felony murder as a strict liability crime, because, at
least in theory, the mens rea for the homicide is formally retained
56 See Pryor v. Rose, 724 F.2d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The Tennessee
courts have held . . . that the felony-murder provision allows willfulness, deliberation,
malice and premeditation to be supplied by the commission of the underlying felony.");
Bizup v. Tinsley, 211 F.Supp. 545, 549 (D. Colo. 1962) ("Thus, in felony-murder, malice is imputed, whereas in ordinary murder it must be demonstrated. Logically, this is a
problem of proof ..
"); Amlotte v. State, 456 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1984) ("State of
mind is immaterial for the felony is said to supply the intent."); Note, supra note 28, at
372 & n. 15 (felony-murder rules impute state of mind necessary for first degree murder
conviction).
57 Morris, supra note 17, at 61.
58 See, e.g., Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q.
191, 210 (1952) (proposing that the rule be changed to eliminate conclusive character of
inference of intent); Note, supra note 31, at 366 (felony-murder rule is used to create
conclusive presumption of intent); Comment, supra note 30, at 255 (malice is conclusively presumed under felony-murder rule); Note, The CalforniaSupreme Court Assaults the
Felony-MurderRule, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1059 (1970) (felony-murder rule as conclusive
presumption); Comment, ConstitutionalLimitations Upon the Use of Statutory Criminal Presumptions and the Felony-Murder Rule, 46 Miss. LJ. 1021, 1036 (1975) ("the [conclusive]
presumption is not mentioned in the statute itself but is rather the underlying rationale
which surfaces upon analysis by the courts").
The term "presumption" is a broad one. A true presumption is an evidentiary device that enables the trier of fact to conclude that the ultimate fact (the fact to be proved)
exists from proofofa basic fact. A presumption thus aids a prosecutor in a criminal case
by allowing ajury to find the elements of a crime by presuming their existence from the
proof of the basic facts. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 811 (2d ed. 1972).
Courts and commentators, however, have recognized several different types of presumptions. A "conclusive presumption" requires the trier of fact to find the existence of
the ultimate fact upon proof of the basic fact without a chance of rebuttal by the defendant. Therefore, a "conclusive presumption," is not actually an evidentiary device, but a
substantive rule of law, because it allows the basic fact to serve as the basis of conviction.
See Note, After Sandstrom: The Constitutionalityof Presumptionsthat Shift the Burden of Production-Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N. W.2d 570 (1980), 1981 Wis. L. REv. 519, 521
n.1 & n.6.
On the other end of the spectrum are "permissive inferences," which do not affect
the burden of proof, but raise mere inferences which the trier of fact is free to either
reject or accept. Permissive inferences are not true presumptions either, as the trier of
fact is not required to rely upon them, but may treat them simply as other pieces of
evidence to consider. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
The other types of presumptions shift either the burden of proof or the burden of
production to the defendant. These are true presumptions, as the jury is required to use
the presumption unless the defendant meets the proper burden of disproving its validity. The Supreme Court has labelled burden shifting presumptions "mandatory presumptions," because the trier of fact is required to rely on the presumption unless
rebutted. Id. at 157-58. However, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the extent
to which presumptions that shift the burden of production are mandatory. See infra
notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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separate and apart from the mens rea for the felony. 59 Conceptualizing the rule as a conclusive presumption also avoids the problems
of applying the transferred intent theory, because it recognizes that
the mens rea required for the felony and for the murder are distinct.
Nevertheless, the conclusive presumption approach has its own
flaws, because "[p]roof of the underlying intent [for the felony]
bears little relationship to the likelihood that the killing was premeditated." 6 0 Furthermore, the use of a conclusive presumption in
the criminal law context raises grave constitutional questions. 61 In
the end, the felony-murder rule is "just a conclusion and not a rea62
son for reaching that conclusion."
D.

Retribution and General Culpability: A Strict Liability View
of the Felony-Murder Rule

Courts and commentators viewing the felony-murder rule as a
conclusive presumption retain a separate mens rea element for the
homicide, which is irrebuttably attributed to the defendant from the
commission of the felony. An alternative approach is to view the
rule as not requiring a separate mens rea element for the homicide,
but as justifying conviction for murder simply on the basis that the
63
defendant committed a felony and a killing occurred.
Courts adopting this view see felony murder as a distinct form
of homicide: "[T]he elements of felony-murder are simply the intentional commission of a felony and the killing of a human being in
the course thereof." 64 The justifications advanced for this concep59
Morris, supra note 17, at 60. "[T]he mens rea or 'malice' necessary for the felony
is in every instance different from the mens rea or 'malice aforethought' required for
murder; but for certain killings the law will allow the latter to be conclusively proved
from the former." Id.
60 Comment, supra note 58, at 1037; see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text.
61
See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
62
Gegan, CriminalHomicide in the Revised New York Penal Code, 12 N.Y.L.F. 565, 586
(1966).
63
See Comment, supra note 58, at 1038 (according to this rationale, "the legislature
is not creating a crime in which the requisite mens rea is presumed; the legislature is
creating a new crime in which premeditation or malice aforethought is simply not an
element"). See also GA. CODE § 16-5-1(c) (1984) ("A person also commits the offense of
murder when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human
being irrespective of malice.").
64 Westberry v. Mullaney, 406 F. Supp. 407, 417 (S.D. Me.), aFfd, 535 F.2d 1333
(1st Cir. 1976). In the recent case of People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194
Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983), the California Supreme Court candidly recognized that "ifthe
effect of the felony-murder rule on malice is indeed a 'presumption,' it is a 'conclusive'
one." Id. at 474, 668 P.2d at 716-17, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 410. The court avoided the
problems of conclusive presumptions by characterizing California's felony-murder rule
as "'a rule of substantive law . . . and not merely an evidentiary shortcut to finding
malice.'" Id. at 475, 668 P.2d at 718, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 411 (quoting People v. Stamp, 2
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tualization are deterrence of the underlying felony, 65 and the notion

that the felon has exhibited an "evil mind" justifying severe
punishment.
The "evil mind" theory of felony murder finds its roots in sev66
enteenth and eighteenth century English notions of criminology.
Mens rea was a less developed concept and judges focused on the
harm resulting from a defendant's illegal act, rather than the maliciousness of his intent. 6 7 The felony-murder rule thus partly operated on an unarticulated rationale that one who does bad acts
cannot complain about being punished for their consequences, no
matter how unexpected. Moreover, the felony-murder rule conceived from an "evil mind" perspective comported with the retribution theory of punishment prevailing at the time of the rule's
development, which focused on the resulting harm, not on the actor's mental state, in deciding the appropriate punishment. 68 A
convict, therefore, bore responsibility for his felony and for any
harmful result arising from the crime regardless of his specific
69
intentions.
Continued reliance on a general culpability theory to justify the
Cal. App. 3d 203, 210, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 602 (1969), cert. denied sub nom. Stamp v. California, 400 U.S. 819 (1970)). See also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 686 (1980)
(District of Columbia felony-murder statute "does not require proof of an intent to kill
[,only] proof of a killing and of the commission or attempted commission of [a] specified
felon[y]"); Guam v. Sablan, 584 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1978); Guam v. Root, 524 F.2d
195, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976) ("abandoned and malignant
heart" in commission of felony is all that is required); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672,
741, 299 N.W.2d 304, 332 (1980) (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (felony murder does not contain malice element, but only requires commission of felony
and killing); People v. Sturgis, 86 A.D.2d 775, 488 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (1982); State v.
Wanrow, 91 Wash. 2d 301, 311, 588 P.2d 1320, 1325 (1978) ("The intent necessary to
prove the felony-murder is the intent necessary to prove the underlying felony."); State
v. Peyton, 29 Wash. App. 701, 719, 630 P.2d 1362, 1373 (1981); State v. Sims, 248
S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1978) ("[T]he common law created [felony murder] so as not to
include the element that the homicide has to be committed with malice or an intent to
kill.").
65 State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 29, 35-37.
66 Case Comment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 591, 593-96 (1970).
67 Id. at 594.
68 Id.; see also G. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 284-85. Fletcher agrees that the felonymurder rule is a remnant of the "harm-oriented" approach to the early common law that
has given way to a contemporary "act-oriented approach" which focuses on culpability
for the particular act. Fletcher also suggests that the idea of "tainting" is a possible
"subconscious prop" of felony murder. The concept of tainting, which dates back to the
nineteenth century, revolves around the idea that the felon is somehow tainted by the
fact a death occurred, and the state must act to expunge the taint. Id. at 426-27.
69 W. LA FAVE & A. Scoi-r, CRIMINAL LAW 560 (1972) ("The rationale [is] that one
who commits a felony is a bad person with a bad state of mind, and he has caused a bad
result, so that we should not worry too much about the fact that the fatal result. . . was
quite different and a good deal worse than the bad result he intended.").
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felony-murder rule has been described as a rather "primitive rationale" 70 and as "a tribute to the tenacity of legal conceptions rooted in
simple moral attitudes."' 7' The "evil mind" theory conflicts with the
basic premise that "the criminal law is concerned not only with guilt
or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal
liability." 72 Although the general culpability rationale was perhaps
sufficient as long as a general intent of wrongdoing established malice aforethought, 73 it conflicts with the progressive trend of categorizing homicide according to the degree of culpability.7 4 Indeed,
the felony-murder rule viewed from a general culpability perspective effectively eliminates a mens rea element in convicting a felon
for a killing occurring during the commission of a felony, and results in the rule operating as a strict liability crime: the occurrence
of a killing is punished as murder regardless of the defendant's
75
culpability.
70
71

W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 69, at 554.
J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 455 (1947).

72

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975).
One reason legislatures and courts are reluctant to abandon the felony-murder
rule is that the rule "represents a formal approximation of extremely reckless homicide." Fletcher, supra note 11, at 415. In many cases where the felony-murder rule is
invoked, the defendant is probably guilty of either intentional or extremely reckless
73

homicide. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 36-37 (Official Draft 1980);

Fletcher, supra note 11, at 415-16. Nevertheless, the rule is overinclusive, because it
encompasses many killings where the felon is either not guilty of homicide, G.
FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 276, or the degree of homicide does not correspond with the
felon's level of culpability. Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1578. Moreover, our system of
criminal justice assigns "criminal liability .. . to individuals, not generalities ...
Criminal punishment should be premised. . . on something more than a probability of
guilt." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 37 (Official Draft 1980).
74 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 commentary at 6 (Official Draft 1980); see also id. § 210.2, at 37-9; People v. Aaron, 409 Mich.
672, 708-13, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316-319 (1980).
Professor Morris objects to a "unitary conception" of malice for the felony and
homicide as "absurd," because "the difference between involuntary manslaughter and
common law murder entirely disappears." Morris, supra note 17, at 61. Professor Morris is correct about the absurdity of the result, but the "unitary conception" appears to
have had some basis at common law. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text; see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment at 31 ("[The felony-murder rule] may have
made sense under the [early] conception of mens rea as something approaching a general
criminal disposition .... ").
75 The "evil mind" rationale does not strictly comport with the idea of strict liability, as some type of general culpability for the homicide is attributed to the felon. The
basis of the rationale, however, is the same, as it assigns criminal liability without regard
to the level of culpability involved; an accidental killing, therefore, is punished in most
jurisdictions as if it were an intentional, deliberate and premeditated murder. The imposition of criminal penalties where no specific finding of culpability has been made
violates the same principles that prohibit punishing acts which the actor did not intend.
In neither case did the defendant necessarily act with a state of mind justifying the punishment.
Jeffries & Stephen, supra note 5, distinguish between a categorical approach to the
felony-murder rule and a "package" approach. The categorical approach views the
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Two basic conceptualizations of the felony-murder rule emerge
from the foregoing examination of the rule's proffered purposes.
Both the transferred intent-constructive malice and the strict liability theories have been widely criticized on policy grounds, yet they
continue to be cited by the courts as justifications for the rule. Recently developed constitutional doctrines in the areas of due process
and the eighth amendment, however, have elevated the policy criticisms of these theories to the level of constitutional infirmities.
II
PRESUMPTIONS, DUE PROCESS, AND THE FELONY-MURDER
RULE

The transferred intent-constructive malice theory of felony
murder, as noted above, 7 6 operates in practice as a conclusive presumption: the mens rea required for murder is irrebuttably presumed from the defendant's mens rea in committing the felony.
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that conclusive presumptions
are unconstitutional, because they relieve the government of its burden of proving every element of the crime and because they violate
the defendant's presumption of innocence. When applied to the felony-murder rule, these Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the
rule's injustice in imposing punishment for a homicide without a
homicide as distinct from the felony, which would make the imposition of penalties for
the homicide on the basis of the felony a classic strict liability offense because no independent basis for punishing the homicide would exist. Id. at 1383-84. They dismiss
the categorical approach, however, as having a "certain sense of unreality." Id. at 1384.
Their preferred analysis is a "package approach," which views the homicide as an adjunct of the underlying crime and makes the focus not proof of culpability, but whether
the aggregate penalties are proportionate to the blameworthiness so as to not violate the
eighth amendment. Id. at 1384.
The authors are correct as to the technical distinction between the two views and
the applicability of the eighth amendment, but they incorrectly assume that the "package" approach makes culpability for the homicide apart from the felony irrelevant.
Other commentators have properly noted that strict liability principles are still applicable because the rule eliminates inquiry as to what level of culpability, if any, is involved:
"The strict-liability aspect [of felony murder] . . . makes any homicide murder ... ,
regardless of whether it was accidental, negligent or intentional." Note, supra note 58, at
1059 fn.3.
Another commentator has used felony murder as an example of "vicarious liability," because the rule "may impose liability on a defendant who was only negligent, and
sometimes not even negligent, even though more culpability is required for each element of the underlying offense." Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1578. Saltzman thus includes felony murder as an example "[iun addition to strict criminal liability ...
where
the common law does not adhere to the doctrine of mens rea." Id. Where the vicarious
liability aspect of felony murder makes a felon responsible for a killing done by another
party during the felony, however, the rule resembles absolute liability, not strict liability,
as neither actus reus nor mens rea is required.
76 See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
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specific finding of culpability, and suggest that the rule's continued
use violates fundamental constitutional principles.
A.

The Supreme Court's Standards of Due Process

In In Re Winship,7 7 the Supreme Court held for the first time
that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 7 8 The
Court determined that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
"provid[ed] concrete substance for the presumption of
'7 9
innocence."
The Court elaborated on the meaning of Winship in Mullaney v.
Wilbur.8 0 In Mullaney, the Court unanimously held that the state
must prove each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 8 ' Because Maine law defined murder as requiring malice
aforethought, 2 which necessarily included the absence of "heat of
passion," the Court concluded that the state could not shift the burpassion
den to the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat 8of
3
without violating the due process guarantees of Winship.
The Court confined the potential ramifications of Mullaney in
Patterson v. New York. 8 4 In Patterson, the Court upheld a statutory
scheme which made severe emotional distress an affirmative defense
to murder. The Patterson Court held that Mullaney should not be
read to require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
presence or absence of every fact affecting either the blameworthiness of the defendant or the severity of punishment.8 5 Instead, Mul397 U.S. 358 (1970).
78 Id. at 364. In Winship, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a 12 year
old boy for larceny because the conviction rested upon a mere preponderance of the
evidence. The Court held that the New York statute permitting conviction ofjuveniles
77

based on a preponderance of the evidence was unconstitutional.
79

Id. at 363.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
81
Id. at 698.
82 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964), current version at ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17A, § 201 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
83 421 U.S. at 700-04. The trial court had instructed the jury that once the state
proved that the defendant had acted intentionally and unlawfully, malice aforethought
was conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation. The state
claimed that malice was not an element of felonious homicide, but the Court noted that
malice was the only distinction between murder and manslaughter with their significantly different penalties. Id. at 691-92, 698.
84 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Interestingly, the Court disavowed any intention of overruling Mullaney.
85 Id. at 214-15. The Court was unwilling to read Mullaney too broadly in part because that might "discourage Congress from enacting pending legislation to change the
80

felony-murder rule by permitting the accused to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
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laney was seen as prohibiting only the "shifting of the burden of
persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so important
that it must be either proved or presumed." 86 Because New York
defined murder simply as an intentional killing, 87 the state could
properly make severe emotional disturbance a mitigating factor
which the defendant could prove as an affirmative defense.8 8 The
Court, therefore, adopted a formalistic approach which focused
upon how the state defined the crime. The Court noted, however,
that the Constitution limited the states' power to define the elements of a crime.8 9
The tension between Mullaney and Pattersonis best characterized
as a dispute over how to delineate the limits of a state's power to
define the "essential facts" of a crime. Mullaney placed these limits
beyond the state's legislative power by outlining two crucial criteria:
whether the facts have been viewed in the Anglo-American legal tradition as being of great legal importance in defining the crime and
whether the facts make a substantial difference in the punishment
imposed or the stigma involved. 9 0 Facts with these characteristics
are facts " 'necessary to constitute the crime with which [the accused] is charged,' "91 and the state bears the burden of proving
them beyond a reasonable doubt. 92 In such a case, the state's options are limited to abolishing the use of the factors in defining the
crimes, 93 creating new affirmative defenses, 9 4 or shifting the burden
of production to the defendant while the state retains the burden of
persuasion. 9 5 The Mullaney Court thus established substantive
rules restricting the state's power to define crimes without shouldering the burden of persuasion.
In contrast, the Patterson Court broadly interpreted the state's
power to define a crime. According to Patterson, the state need only
prove beyond a reasonable doubt "all of the elements included in the
dence the affirmative defense that the homicide committed was neither a necessary nor a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the underlying felony." Id. at 215 n.15.
86
87

88

Id. at 215.
N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 125.25(i) (McKinney 1975).

Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205-06.
Id. at 210.
90 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 692-701; see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., dissenting) (reviewing analysis used by Mullaney majority).
91 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 221 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970)).
92 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.
93 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 228.
94 Id. at 229-30.
95 Id. at 230-31. Justice Powell properly noted, however, that some limits exist on
shifting the burden of production to the defendant in a criminal case. Id. at 230 n.16.
See also infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
89
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definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged." 96 The judicial focus then becomes what "the State deems so important that it must
be either proved or presumed." 9 7 Consistent with the changed focus from Mullaney, the Patterson majority analyzed the issue in terms
of "elements" rather than "facts," connoting a much more elastic
approach to the problem of definition.
Furthermore, Patterson apparently placed only very basic constitutional limits on the state's power to define crimes. Indeed, as its
example of a state exceeding these limits, the Court stated that "[i]t
is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual
guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." 9 8 This example clearly
contravenes even the most restrictive definition of a defendant's
presumption of innocence. The Court's failure to describe more
narrowly a state's power to define crimes implies that few constitutional limits restrict that power.
Mullaney and Patterson constitute the two extremes on a continuum delineating the limits on a state's power to define crimes. Both
extremes have shortcomings. By focusing on Anglo-American legal
tradition, Mullaney's approach fails to include within its constitutional strictures "new" substantive crimes with significant punishments and stigma. Similarly, this historical approach would impede
modern penal law reform and innovation by "exalting the traditional law of crimes and fixing its content as a normative standard
for constitutional adjudication." 9 9 For instance, this approach
would impede reform where a legislature desired to provide previously unavailable affirmative defenses which affected a "fact" of the
crime.10 0 In such a situation, a legislature either would have to
forego the innovation or abandon its "traditional" formulation of
the crime to avoid assuming the evidentiary burden. 0 1
Patterson's danger lies in its failure to place any meaningful constitutional limits on a state's power to define crimes. The Patterson
majority spoke of "obvious constitutional limits,"' 1 2 but the majority's approach "allows a legislature to shift, virtually at will, the bur96

432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).

Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
Id. at 210 (quoting McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86
(1916)). The Court also stated that "[t]he legislature [could not] 'validly command that
the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create
a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt.' " 432 U.S. at 210 (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943)).
99 Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 5, at 1364.
100 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214 n.15 (suggesting that historical approach might jeopardize legislative proposal to provide affirmative defense to federal felony-murder rule).
101 Id. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that state could abolish distinction
between murder and manslaughter, and treat all unjustifiable homicide as murder).
97
98

102

Id. at 210.
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den of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case, so
long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in
the statutory language that defines the crime." 1 0 3 In criticizing the
majority decision, Justice Powell asserted that a
state statute could pass muster under the only solid standard that

appears in the Court's opinion if it defined murder as mere physical contact between the defendant and the victim leading to the
victim's death, but then set up an affirmative defense leaving it to
the defendant to prove that he acted without culpable mens rea.
The State, in other words, could be relieved altogether of responsibility for proving anything regarding the defendant's state of
mind, provided only that the face of the statute meets the Court's
drafting formulas.104

Although the example is an extreme one,10 5 it highlights the difficulty of deriving any meaningful constitutional limits from the Patterson majority's holding.
The courts and commentators, however, generally have not
read Patterson as granting legislatures the degree of discretion that
Justice Powell feared.' 0 6 For example, one court interpreted Patterson as making Mullaney a procedural due process case which protected a substantive value:
Patterson left intact the functional analysis applied by the Mullaney
Court. . . . [T]he federal courts are not bound to accept blindly
a State's characterization of its own law. Instead, they look to see
if the truth of an "affirmative defense" is logically inconsistent

with the truth of an essential element of the crime, as the crime's
10 7
elements are defined by the State.
The protected substantive value is derived from the elements of the
crime that the state could not constitutionally disregard in imposing
criminal liability, or from the elements that the state has chosen to
incorporate in its definition of the offense.10 8 Even after Patterson,
therefore, a "constitutional floor for the substantive criminal
103

Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 224 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
105 Justice Powell had "no doubt that the Court would find some way to strike down
a formalistically correct statute as egregious as the one hypothesized. . . [b]ut [the Patterson] ruling suggests no principled basis for concluding that such a statute falls outside
the 'obvious' constitutional limits the Court invokes." Id. at 225 n.9 (citation omitted).
106
But see Allen, The Restoration of In Re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion
in CriminalCases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30, 54 (1977) (concluding
that Patterson Court implicitly overruled Mullaney); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of
Justice: Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299, 1312-30 (1977) (asserting that Constitution leaves legislatures free to choose criteria for criminal conviction
and punishment).
107
Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 626 n.33 (5th Cir.1980).
108
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 215.
104
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law" 0 9 presumably exists. Although Patterson provides little guidance as to where the constitutional line is drawn, commentators
have turned to fundamental concepts such as actus reas, mens rea,
and fairness in describing the line's location. 1 10
B.

Presumptions and Due Process

In Ulster County Court v. Allen, I"' the Court attempted to resolve
the issues concerning the use of presumptions in criminal proceedings that had been raised by the holdings in Winship, Mullaney, and
Patterson.112 The Court held that "the ultimate test of any device's
constitutional validity in any given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial,
based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 113 The Court distinguished permissive and mandatory presumptions on the basis of their effect on the
factfinder.
The Court defined a permissive presumption as one that "allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact
from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no
burden of any kind on the defendant." ' 1' 4 The Court restricted the
defendant's challenge of a permissive presumption to a showing
that "under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference."' 15 The
Court's rationale for such a limited attack was that the presumption
affected the trier of fact only to the extent that the presumption was
so irrational that it allowed the "factfinder to make an erroneous
factual determination." ' 1 6 Thus, for a permissive presumption to
be constitutional, the presumed fact need only follow "more likely
than not" on the facts of the case from proof of the basic fact.117
109

Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 5, at 1365.

110

Id. at 1370-79 (constitutional minima of actus reus, mens rea, and proportional-

ity). Another commentator suggests extending substantive due process analysis to in-

clude the "question of whether the statutory scheme is fair, utilizing a classic balancing
approach." Ranney, Presumptions in Criminal Cases: A New Look at an Old Problem, 41
MoNT. L.REv. 21, 37 (1980); see also infra notes 214-45 (discussing limits on defining
strict liability crimes).
111 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
112 See supra note 58 (discussing various types of presumptions).
113 Allen, 442 U.S. at 156 (citing Winship and Mullaney as precedent).

114

Id. at 157.

115 Id.
116 Id.
117 The Court first articulated the "more likely than not" standard in Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-36 (1969). See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970)
(applying more likely than not standard to permissive presumption). The test was derived from a line of cases dealing with presumptions starting with Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463 (1943), and extending through Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
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The Court found mandatory presumptions to be "far more
troublesome."' 18 The Court held that such presumptions required
facial examination because the factfinder "must find the elemental
fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has
come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts."' 19 The Court found that the presumption in Allen was a permissive one, and, therefore, did not discuss the
appropriate standard to be used in analyzing a mandatory presumption. The majority suggested, however, that "since the prosecution
bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a [mandatory] presumption [that shifts the burden of persuasion] unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference
20
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Two weeks after the Allen decision, a unanimous Court in Sandstrom v. Montana' 2 1 expressly held conclusive presumptions to be unconstitutional. The trial judge in Sandstrom had instructed the jury
that " '[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.' ",122 In finding this instruction unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that such a presumption relieved
the state of its burden of proving an element of the crime, the de12 3
fendant's intent, in violation of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson.
The Court further relied upon Morissette v. United States124 and United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. 12 5 in articulating two particular con(1957), United States v. Ramano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), and United States v. Gainey, 380
U.S. 63 (1965). Somejudges and commentators have condemned the standard as conflicting with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard articulated in Winship, See, e.g.,
Ranney, supra note 110, at 32-33 & n.50.
118 Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
119 Id. (emphasis in original). The Court further distinguished mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of production from those that shift the burden of persuasion.
Id. at 157 n.16. The Court stated that presumptions considered in prior cases fit almost
uniformly in the former category, and suggested that if the burden of production were
"extremely low," the presumption might operate only as a permissive inference. Id. See
also discussion infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
120 Allen, 442 U.S. at 167. Justice Powell, dissenting, declined to reach the issue of
whether the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" should be used in analyzing
mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion. Instead, Justice Powell
would have invalidated the presumption in Allen on the basis of a facial analysis showing
that the presumed fact was not "more likely than not" to be true. Id. at 174. He also
noted that the Court in Allen distinguished between permissive and mandatory presumptions for the first time. Id. at 170 n.3. Justice Powell believed that the majority was
essentially "applying an unarticulated harmless error-standard." Id. at 177.
121 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
122
123

Id. at 515.
Id. at 520-24.

124 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morissette, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
conviction for converting government property because the trial judge did not permit
the jury to decide whether the defendant had the requisite criminal intent.
125 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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stitutional infirmities inherent in conclusive presumptions.
First, a conclusive presumption "would conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which
extends to every element of the crime." 126 To require that the state need
only prove the basic fact (in Sandstrom, causing the death) for the
jury mandatorily to find the ultimate fact (Sandstrom's intent to kill)
would emasculate Winship's requirement that every element be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and Mullaney's mandate that the
state carry the burden of proof.' 27 The presumption would "effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense,"' 28 thereby
relieving the state of its burden of persuasion.
Second, the Court reasoned that a conclusive presumption
would invade the factfinding function of the jury. 29 The Court
noted that "in a criminal case the law assigns [the factfinding function] solely to the jury,"' 3 0 and to require ajury to find the ultimate
fact solely on the basis of the presumption would relieve the jury of
3
that function.1 '
126
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
274-75 (1952)) (emphasis added by Court).
See id. at 523-54.
127
Id. at 522 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952)).
128
Id. at 523. The Court quoted United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
129
U.S. 422, 446 (1978) in support of this proposition.
130
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523.
The Supreme Court recently considered whether an instruction violating Sand131
strom could constitute harmless error. Connecticut v.Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983). The
Court divided evenly over the issue, withJustice Stevens concurring in the judgment but
declining to reach the issue because the state court had declined to decide it. The four
Justices in the plurality would have narrowly limited the situation where a Sandstrom instruction could constitute harmless error (e.g., where the defendant conceded guilt) and
strongly reaffirmed the necessary role of the jury as a factfinder when a conclusive presumption is involved. Id. at 86 & n.15.
The dissent believed that a conclusive presumption does not take the question of
intent away from the jury, because a jury first must determine that the prosecution has
proven the basic facts before the jury can apply the presumption. Id. at 96 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also argued that the issue is not whether the jury could have or
did rely upon the conclusive presumption, but "whether the evidence was so dispositive
of intent that a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have found it unnecessary to rely on the presumption." Id. at 97 n.5. See also Lamb v.
Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1341 n.14 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming conviction on grounds
that evidence was overwhelming and that erroneous presumption instruction was harmless), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983). The dispute between the two opinions thus
focuses on how the verdict was reached. Whereas fourJustices would reject a "harmless
error" analysis because a reviewing court could not be certain that the jury affirmatively
made a finding of intent without aid of the presumption, the dissenters seem content
with a finding that the jury's guilty verdict was substantiated by all the evidence, regardless of whether it relied on the conclusive presumption.
Although the dissent's position may be defensible if the primary concern is merely
whether the defendant was guilty, its conclusion that the intent issue is still left to the
jury, despite the conclusive presumption, is not tenable. The dissent relied partly on the
fact that the judge instructed that the issue of intent was ultimately left to thejury. 460
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In addition, the Sandstrom Court discussed the state's alternative
characterization of the presumption as one shifting the burden of
persuasion rather than as a conclusive presumption.1 32 Citing Mullaney and Patterson, the Court held that a presumption that shifted
the burden of persuasion was also unconstitutional because such a
presumption would relieve the state of its obligation to prove every
33
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'
By holding that presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion
were per se unconstitutional, the Sandstrom Court contradicted the
dicta in Allen that suggested that such a presumption would be con34
stitutional if it satisfied a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Surprisingly, the Sandstrom Court did not even mention the language
in Allen, 135 and it discussed the question briefly as if no doubt could
exist that a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion was unconstitutional. 136 The Court based its holding primarily on Mullaney
and characterized the instruction in Mullaney that the burden was on
the defendant to show he acted in heat of passion as "a presumption [shifting the burden of persuasion which] was found constitu7
tionally deficient."'1s
The intriguing effect of Sandstrom on Allen is that it renders the
Allen Court's discussion of mandatory presumptions meaningless to
the extent that the discussion suggested a standard of review for
mandatory presumptions. 38 A possible exception could exist for
U.S. at 101. However, the judge also instructed the jury that the law required them to
conclusively presume that the defendant intended the natural and necessary consequences of his act. Id. at 78. Therefore, assuming, as we must, that the jury followed the
judge's instructions and applied the conclusive presumption upon finding the basic fact
(simply that the act was committed by the defendant), the issue of intent was not left for
the jury to decide. See People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 2d 539, 550, 684 P.2d 826, 831, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 270 (1984) (instruction taking issue completely from jury is reversible error
per se). But see State v. Bolin, 678 S.W.2d 40, 45 (Tenn. 1984) (overwhelming evidence
made Sandstrom-type error harmless beyond reasonable doubt).
132 The Court analyzed both conclusive and burden of persuasion shifting presumptions because the jury could have viewed the instruction either way. Sandstrom, 442 U.S.
at 524.
133

Id.

Allen, 442 U.S. at 167. Because the Allen court found the presumption in issue to
be a permissive inference, its treatment of a mandatory presumption shifting the burden
of persuasion was dicta. See also id. at 169 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting) (expressing no
opinion on constitutionality of presumptions shifting burden of persuasion).
135
Earlier in the Sandstrom opinion, the Court found Allen inapplicable as it "did not
.. .involve presumptions of the conclusive or persuasion-shifting variety." 442 U.S. at
520 n.9.
136 The Court discussed the issue in a brief summary of the holdings in Mullaney and
Patterson. Id. at 524.
137
Id. The Mullaney Court did not discuss whether such a presumption might be
valid if it satisfied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
138 The Allen Court stated that a mandatory presumption was "generally examined
. ..on its face to determine the extent to which the basic and elemental facts coincide."
134
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mandatory presumptions shifting only the burden of production, 139
but Sandstrom's inescapable import is that both conclusive presumptions and mandatory presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion violate Winship and its progeny.
C.

The Felony-Murder Rule and Due Process After Sandstrom
v. Montana

Sandstrom casts serious doubt upon the constitutionality of the
transferred intent-constructive malice theory of the felony-murder
rule. Under this theory, the rule retains a separate mens rea for the
felony and the homicide, but irrebuttably imputes the mens rea required for the homicide from that necessary for the felony.140
This theoretical scheme is indistinguishable from the operation
of the conclusive presumption that was invalidated in Sandstrom. In
Sandstrom, the Court observed: "Upon finding proof of one element
of the crime (causing death), and of facts insufficient to establish the
second (the voluntariness and 'ordinary consequences' of defendant's action), Sandstrom's jurors could reasonably have concluded
that they were directed to find against defendant on the element of
intent." 14 1 Likewise, under the felony-murder rule, once a jury
finds proof of the basic fact of a killing during the commission of a
felony, even without any proof of culpability for the homicide, it also
must find that the defendant possessed the mens rea required for
murder.
In short, the felony-murder rule has the same two constitutional
infirmities found in Sandstrom. The Sandstrom Court reaffirmed in
442 U.S. at 158. The analysis would thus focus not on the facts of the case before the
Court, but on a facial analysis "based on the presumption's accuracy in the run of
cases." Id. at 159.
After Sandstrom, facial analysis of presumptions, however, may not ever be necessary. If the presumption is a permissive inference, it is reviewed as applied, and if it is a
mandatory presumption, it would be invalid under Sandstrom either because it is conclusive or because it shifts the burden of proof.
The one possible reconciliation of Sandstrom and Allen is that the Allen Court characterized prior mandatory presumption cases as "almost uniformly fit[ting] into the...
subclass [of presumptions shifting only the burden of production], in that they never
totally removed the ultimate burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution." Id. at 158 n. 16. Even mandatory presumptions shifting the burden of production, however, may be unconstitutional after Sandstrom. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516
n.5; infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
139
The Court did not directly address the questions raised by a presumption that
shifts only the burden of production, because it rejected the state's characterization of
the jury instruction as shifting only the burden of production. 442 U.S. at 515-16. In a
footnote, the Court observed, however, that failure to meet the burden of production
for a defendant cannot have the effect of a directed verdict on the defendant. Id. at 516
n.5. See generally infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
140
See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
141
442 U.S. at 523.
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constitutional terms that the presumption of innocence "extends to
every element of the crime."1 4 2 Because the transferred intent-constructive malice theory formally retains a mens rea element for a homicide, the presumption of innocence must apply to the homicide
aspect of the rule. Yet, the felony-murder rule completely bypasses
the presumption of innocence as to this element upon proof of a
different element, the occurrence of a killing during the commission
of a felony.
Similarly, the felony-murder rule, like the jury instruction in
Sandstrom, invades the factfinding function of the jury. Whether the
mens rea element for the homicide under the felony-murder rule is
defined as requiring recklessness or intent,' 4 3 the jury is not required to make an affirmative finding of the defendant's culpability.
Instead, the jury is allowed only to deliberate on whether a killing
occurred during the commission of a felony. Upon its finding of
that fact, the rule requires the jury to find automatically that the de144
fendant had a culpable state of mind.
Apparently, no court has considered expressly the felony-murder rule in light of Sandstrom. After Mullaney, challenges to the felony-murder rule succeeded only in forcing courts to interpret their
respective versions of the rule as requiring no mens rea element for
the homicide. 14 5 Challenges based upon Sandstrom similarly would
142
Id. at 522 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75 (1952))
(emphasis in original).
143 See supra notes 38-40. Jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Penal Code
formulation frequently characterize the requisite culpability in terms of the common law
concept of malice. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash. 2d 301, 306, 588 P.2d 1320, 1322
(1978) (en banc) (theoretical basis of felony murder is that "general malice" may be
inferred from felonious intent).
144
Although the felony-murder rule is used in different ways by different states, see
supra notes 7-9, 53-56 and accompanying text, the Alabama statute is typical of many
today:
(a) A person commits the crime of murder if:

(3) He commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, burglary in the first or second degree, escape in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, rape in the first degree, robbery in any degree,
sodomy in the first degree or any other felony clearly dangerous to
human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he
is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of any
person.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3) (1982). The statute thus requires ajury to find murder upon
finding a killing during one of the enumerated felonies, regardless of the defendant's
actual culpability.
145
See, e.g., People v. Root, 524 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1076 (1976) (felony-murder statute does not require intent to kill); Westberry v. Mullaney, 406 F. Supp. 407, 415-17 (D. Me. 1976) (noting "significant constitutional challenge" if intent to kill is element of felony murder, but finding whether killing "intended
or even accidental" to be irrelevant), ajfd sub nom. Westberry v. Murphy, 535 F.2d 1333

19851

FELONY-MURDER RULE

471

require a court either to eliminate a mens rea element for the homicide aspect of felony murder 14 6 or to find the rule an unconstitutional conclusive presumption of the ultimate fact of culpability for
the killing.
D.

The Model Penal Code and the Rebuttable Presumption
Approach

The drafters of the Model Penal Code would have preferred to
abolish felony murder, "but such a course was thought impolitic,
given the weight of prosecutive opposition."'' 47 The Code instead
provides that criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
[I]t is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting ex(1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Westberry v. Oliver, 429 U.S. 889 (1976); People v. Dillon,
34 Cal. 3d. 441, 475, 668 P.2d 697, 718, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 411 (1984) (felony murder
does not require malice or premeditation, only specific intent to commit particular felony); State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 1976) (felony murder is "category" of
first degree murder not requiring wilfulness, deliberation, and premeditation); State v.
Wanrow, 91 Wash. 2d 301, 311-12, 588 P.2d 1320, 1325 (1978) (en banc) (due process
not violated because felony murder does not presume intent); State v. Sims, 248 S.E.2d
834, 843 (W. Va. 1978) (felony murder does not require malice, premeditation or intent).
The concurring opinion in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980),
noted that if the felony-murder rule is a conclusive presumption it might "unconstitutionally dilute the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard." Id. at 742 n.15, 299 N.W.2d
at 333 n. 15. The opinion avoided this issue, however, by characterizing the felony-murder rule as a distinct crime without a mens rea element for the killing. Id. at 740-41, 299
N.W.2d at 332.
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),Justice White, in a separate opinion, noted
a similar problem with the Ohio "imputed intent" law, which operates in a manner similar to the felony-murder rule:
Of course, the facts of both of these cases [Lockett and Bell v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 637 (1978)] might well permit the inference that the petitioners
did in fact intend the death of the victims. But there is a vast difference
between permitting a factfinder to consider a defendant's willingness to
engage in criminal conduct which poses a substantial risk of death in deciding whether to infer that he acted with a purpose to take life, and defining such conduct as an ultimate fact equivalent to possessing a purpose
to kill as Ohio has done ....

Indeed, the type of conduct which Ohio

would punish by death requires at most the degree of mens rea defined by
the ALI Model Penal Code (1962) as recklessness: conduct undertaken
with knowledge that death is likely to follow.
Id. at 627-28 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, subsequently
suggested that the presumption of intent in murder cases involving aiders and abetters
operates only as an inference. State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St. 2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375
(1980). Cf. Clark v. Jago, 676 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1982) (imputed intent instruction
under Ohio law violates Sandstrom where not made clear that defendant himself must
have purpose to kill), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2360 (1984).
146 When a court eliminates a mens rea element for a homicide under felony murder, defendants may attempt a constitutional attack based on strict liability. See infra
notes 178-251 and accompanying text.
147 Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1446 (1968); see also Crum, supra note 58, at 210 (advocating rebuttable
presumption to replace conclusive inference of intent to kill).
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treme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness
and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary,
kidnapping or felonious escape.148
This presumption goes to an element of homicide as defined by the
Code, and, therefore, it is governed by section 1.12(5):
When the Code establishes a presumption with respect to any
fact which is an element of an offense, it has the following
consequences:
(a) when there is evidence of the facts which give rise to the
presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must
be submitted to the jury, unless the Court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact; and
(b) when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is
submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while the presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the facts
giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact. 149
The Code commentary indicates that although the draftees
abandoned felony murder as an independent basis of liability, they
retained the rule "as a concession to the facilitation of proof."' 150
Furthermore, the drafters considered the presumption to be merely
permissive:
As Section 1.12(5) specifies, the presumption [leaves] the
prosecution the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant acted recklessly and with extreme indifference.
The jury may, however, regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the required culpability unless
the court determines that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives that conclusion. The presumption may, of course, be rebutted by the defendant or may simply not be followed by the jury.
In either of these cases, the defendant may be liable for manslaughter or negligent homicide, as these crimes are defined in
Sections 210.3 and 210.4. If the presumption is not rebutted and
if the jury finds, with or without its aid, that the requisite extreme
indifference in fact existed beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
5
appropriate conviction is murder.1 '

150

§ 210.2(I)(b) (Official Draft 1980).
Id. § 1.12(5).
Id. § 210.2 commentary at 30.

151

Id.

148
149

MODEL PENAL CODE
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The Model Penal Code Rule: Conclusive Presumption or
Presumption Shifting the Burden of Persuasion

The Code's presumption approach to felony murder has been
the least successful of its recommendations for penal code reform. 152 Although the Code's presumption approach is an admirable attempt at reform, it still fails the constitutional tests articulated
in Sandstrom and Allen. Sandstrom dictates that a determination of the
type of presumption involved "depends upon the way in which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction."'' 5 3 The
Model Penal Code section providing for the presumption states that
"[s]uch recklessness and indifference are presumed"' 154 if the circumstances described occur. Hearing such language, a reasonable
juror could easily conclude that the instruction mandates a finding
of recklessness and indifference.
Nor does the Code's presumption language save the provision.
Section 1.12(5)(b) states that "the law declares that the jury may
regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence
of the presumed fact."' 155 The phrase "the law declares" thus describes the presumption in mandatory presumption terms. Concededly, the commentary makes clear that the drafters intended that the
presumption be permissive. 156 In Sandstrom, however, the Supreme
Court rejected the state supreme court's characterization of the presumption at issue as only shifting the burden of production because
a reasonable jury could have interpreted it either as conclusive or as
shifting the burden of persuasion. 157 The Code drafters' intentions
are no more controlling than the state supreme court's characterization in Sandstrom. The Code's presumption, when viewed from a
reasonable juror's perspective, therefore, could effectively shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. Such a shifting would violate the principles of Mullaney and Winship, regardless of the drafters' intentions.
Moreover, even if the presumption does not facially shift the
burden of persuasion, the Code's application of the presumption is
not a "permissive inference" as defined by the Supreme Court's
holding in Allen. The Court drew "the distinction between a permissive presumption on which the prosecution is entitled to rely as one
not necessarily sufficient part of its proof and a mandatory presump152
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 415. Only New Hampshire has adopted the Code's
approach. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630.1-b (1974).
153 442 U.S. at 514; see also Allen, 442 U.S. at 157-63.
154
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (emphasis added).
155 Id. § 1.12(5)(b).
156
See supra text accompanying note 151.
157 442 U.S. at 516-17.
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tion which the jury must accept even if it is the sole evidence of an
element of the offense."' 15 8 The Court concluded that "[a]s long as
it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a
finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the [more likely than not] test de59
scribed in Leafy."1
The Code's supposed permissive inference, however, does not
clearly provide that the felony-murder presumption cannot constitute "the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt." Indeed, the
Code specifies that "the law declares that the jury may regard the
facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed
fact,"1 6 0 and under the Code's felony-murder statute, the presumed
fact is the defendant's culpability. Thus, ajury relying solely on the
felony-murder presumption could find the defendant guilty of murder under the Code; such a presumption is not permissive under the
definition outlined in Allen.
Likewise, the Code's presumption does not satisfy the rationale
underlying Allen's treatment of permissive inferences. The Allen
Court required that a permissive presumption satisfy only the
"more likely than not" standard becausesuch a presumption is only
one piece of evidence in the prosecutor's case. 16 1 As the foregoing
analysis demonstrates, however, the Code's felony-murder presumption can serve as the only piece of evidence in convicting the
defendant of murder.
Once the mandatory nature of the Code's presumption is recognized, its unconstitutionality becomes evident. The Allen Court
concluded that "since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a [mandatory] presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 6 2 As noted above, 163 the Sandstrom Court went one step further and held that, because the effect
of a mandatory presumption is to relieve the state of its burden of
proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, such presumptions violate the holdings of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson.164 The
Code's presumption has just this effect. The prosecution, without
proffering any additional evidence, could rely solely on the presumption to convict a defendant. Accordingly, the Code's felonymurder rule creates a mandatory presumption that conflicts with
Sandstrom.
158
159
160
161

442 U.S. at 166 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5)(b) (Official Draft 1980) (emphasis added).
442 U.S. at 160, 167.

162

Id. at 167.

163

See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.

164
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Finally, even assuming that Allen's "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard retains some vitality after Sandstrom, the Code's
presumption still would be unconstitutional. Allen suggests that presumptions that serve as the sole basis of conviction must be analyzed facially to determine whether they meet the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. 165 The felony-murder rule, however,
has been condemned widely for lacking any necessary correlation
between culpability and outcome.1 66 When the rule as incorporated
by the Code is subjected to a facial analysis, its failure to satisfy the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in particular cases becomes
evident.

2.

1 67

The Model Penal Code Rule: Presumption Shifting The Burden of
Production

The Code's presumption also might be characterized as shifting
the "burden of production," whereby the defendant need not disprove the presumption, but need only present "some" evidence, after which the presumption disappears. As with presumptions
shifting the burden of persuasion, the Allen and Sandstrom Courts apparently came to conflicting conclusions as to the proper standard
of review for presumptions shifting the burden of production. How165 442 U.S. at 159-60. A facial analysis requires that the presumption satisfy the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard apart from and notwithstanding any other evidence
presented in the case. This approach is required because the presumption is not merely
another piece of evidence, but potentially the sole basis of conviction.
166 "If one fact emerges prominently. . . it is the uncertainty and unpredictability
encountered in the assessment of what level of personal criminal culpability will be punished as felony-murder." Note, supra note 31, at 371. The most commonly cited example of the irrationality of the felony-murder rule is where a defendant is held liable for a
victim killing a co-felon. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 17.
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 627 (1978), Justice White noted the potential
incongruity between culpability and outcome in the felony-murder context. Justice Marshall also observed in Lockett that "[w]hether a death results in the course of a felony
(thus giving rise to felony-murder liability) turns on fortuitous events that do not distinguish the intention or moral culpability of the defendants." 438 U.S. at 620 (Marshall,
J., concurring in judgment).
167 Hypotheticals can easily be posed that refute the rule's justification for convicting a defendant of murder. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 11, at 414:
Suppose that an arsonist carefully checks the premises for signs of human
life before setting fire, yet as the blaze erupts, an independently motivated burglar breaks into the house and perishes. One would be hardpressed to regard the arsonist as having acted recklessly toward the unexpected burglar. Or suppose that an unarmed burglar encounters an
occupant with a weak heart; though the burglar attempts to calm the occupant, the latter dies of shock. It is obvious that in some cases a felon
might be reckless in taking the risk of homicide; but in other cases he
might be free from significant fault in bringing on the death.
Fletcher concludes: "The point is that the [Model Penal Code] presumption does not
always hold, and when it does not, there is no reason to regard a killing in the course of
a felony as different from other killings." Id.
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ever, because neither case directly dealt with presumptions shifting
the burden of production, their treatments of such presumptions
are dicta.
The Allen Court suggested that a mandatory presumption that
imposes "an extremely low burden of production-e.g., being satisfied by 'any' evidence" might be analyzed more properly as a permissive presumption.1 6
The Court apparently reasoned that
because the prosecution retained the burden of persuasion, and because the defendant need only provide "any" evidence in rebuttal to
overcome the presumption, "it may well be that its impact is no
*..."169
greater than that of a permissive inference .
Two weeks later, however, the Court in Sandstrom unanimously
took a stronger stance:
We also note that the effect of a failure to meet the production
burden is significantly different for the defendant and prosecution. When the prosecution fails to meet it, a directed verdict in
favor of the defense results. Such a consequence is not possible
upon a defendant's failure, however, as verdicts may not be di170
rected against defendants in criminal cases.
Of course, when a defendant does not meet the burden of production and the mandatory presumption requires a finding of guilt, the
very effect is a directed verdict against the defendant.
The Sandstrom Court's implied disapproval of mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of production is consistent with the
principles of Winship and Mullaney. 17 1 Such presumptions invade the
factfinding function of the jury, because the jury is required to find
the defendant guilty unless the defense presents evidence that overcomes the presumption. Furthermore, although theoretically the
prosecution retains the burden of persuasion on the elements of the
crime, the effect is to relieve it of its burden because it can rely solely
168

(1975).

Allen, 442 U.S. at 158 n.16; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 n.31

Allen, 442 U.S. at 158 n.16.
442 U.S. at 516 n.5 (citations omitted). Justice Powell noted that presumptions
shifting the burden of production raise constitutional questions if they do not satisfy the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Allen, 442 U.S. at 169 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
171
Cf Note, Presumptive Intent Jury Instructions After Sandstrom, 1980 Wis. L. REv.
366, 374 (presumptions that place production burden on defendant raise significant
constitutional questions). But seeJeffries & Stephan, supra note 5, at 1334 (viewing the
burden of production as a "permissible housekeeping device;" the article, however, preceded Allen and Sandstrom).
Justice Powell, dissenting in Patterson, suggested that the burden of production generally could be shifted without offending due process. 432 U.S. at 230-31 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell also noted, however, that "outer limits" exist. Id. at 230
n. 16. Moreover, Justice Powell suggested in his Allen dissent that presumptions shifting
the burden of production may have to meet a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See
supra note 170.
169
170
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on the presumption for a conviction. A presumption shifting the
burden of production thus still negates the defendant's presumption of innocence, because if the defendant does not introduce any
evidence, the presumption by its own force will result in a "directed
verdict" against him. This effect occurs whether the defendant must
come forth with "some" or "any" evidence to meet the burden of
production.
The language of the Code's presumption is particularly likely to
result in a directed verdict against the defendant. The judge must
give the presumption instruction "unless the Court is satisfied that
the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact." 17 2 The
burden of "clearly negatfing]" the presumed fact is a far cry from the
"any evidence" standard of Allen. The Code in essence requires that
the defendant disprove the presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence. In other words, the defendant must bear the burden of
persuasion or risk that the jury will rely on the presumption to convict.17 3 The Code's presumption, therefore, even when judged by
Allen's more lenient standards, has much greater impact than a permissive inference.
3.

The Model Penal Code Rule: A Permissive Inference

If the Code's presumption were clearly reworded to operate
only as a permissive inference that placed no burden of proof on the
defendant, it would satisfy the Allen test merely by showing a rational connection between the proven fact and the presumed fact.
That is, on the facts of a given case, the presumed fact of "reckless[ness] under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life"' 74 would have to follow "more likely than
not" 17 5 from the basic fact of a killing that occurred during the
76
course of one of the enumerated felonies.'
When reduced to a permissive inference, the felony-murder
rule enters the realm of reason. The defendant's recklessness and
extreme indifference become mere inferences that a jury may draw
from the proven facts of a case. Ajury would be justified in making
these types of inferences where the facts warranted, whether or not
the court instructed it to do so. The facts still must supply a "ra1.12(5)(a) (Official Draft 1980) (emphasis added).
The presumption invalidated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, for example, required that the
defendant prove "heat of passion" by a preponderance of the evidence to negate an
inference of intent. 421 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1975).
174
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft 1980).
175 Allen, 442 U.S. at 165-66; Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
176 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft 1980).
172

173

MODEL PENAL CODE §
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tional connection,"' 1 7 7 of course, between the killing during the

course of the enumerated felony and the defendant's culpability, but
the connection is not required, nor must the defendant affirmatively
disprove his culpability.
III
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF
CULPABILITY

Some courts have avoided the prohibitions of Mullaney and
Sandstrom by construing the felony-murder rule as not requiring intent or malice aforethought.17 8 These courts, however, generally
have failed to consider the constitutional implications of imposing
severe penalties for a crime without a mens rea element.' 79 The
Supreme Court recently has addressed this issue in two closely related lines of cases, and these holdings indicate that imposition of
severe punishments for nonregulatory crimes without a finding of
culpability violates constitutional guarantees of the eighth amendment and the due process clause.
A.

Eighth Amendment Guarantees Against Disproportionate
Punishments and Felony Murder

In Enmund v. Florida,'8 0 the Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death penalty for a nontriggerman convicted 'of felony
murder violates the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice White, writing for the majority, stressed
two factors in holding the punishment unconstitutional: the lack of
177
The "rational connection" test is merely another term for the "more likely than
not" test. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 165-66.
178 See cases cited supra notes 64 and 145. See also Comment, supra note 58, at 103738 (noting some courts consider felony murder to be new crime in which neither premeditation nor malice is an element).
179 The two cases that address this issue have done so only indirectly and in a cursory fashion. In Guam v. Root, 524 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076
(1976), the defendant, a nontriggerman, argued that his sentence of life imprisonment
was so disproportionate to his participation in the felony murder, that the sentence violated the eighth amendment. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument as "frivolous"
and noted that armed robbery is still punishable in several states by life imprisonment.
Id. at 198. The court did not address directly the strict liability aspect of the felonymurder rule, but observed that the rule was within a legislature's constitutional powers.
Id. at 197.
Guam v. Sablan, 584 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1978), also rejected an eighth amendment
challenge by a nontriggerman. For purposes of eighth amendment analysis, the court
distinguished between the death penalty cases, upon which the defendant relied, and
noncapital cases. Id. at 341. The legitimacy of this distinction is now doubtful. See infra
notes 186-205 and accompanying text. In Sablan, the Ninth Circuit, as in Root, ignored
the strict liability aspect of felony murder.
180 458 U.S. 782, 788-801 (1982).
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a legitimate penalogical justification and the lack of a justifiable retribution interest.
The Court found that the death penalty would not deter "one
who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be
taken. . . . [I]f a person does not intend that life be taken. . . the
possibility that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not 'enter into the cold calculus that precedes the
decision to act.' "181 Justice White proceeded to analyze the statistical data and agreed with those "competent observers [who] have
concluded that there is no basis in experience for the notion that
death so frequently occurs in the course of a felony for which killing
is not an essential ingredient that the death penalty should be considered as ajustifiable deterrent to the felony itself."1 8 2 The majority thus concluded that no legitimate deterrent effect justified
imposing the death penalty for felony murder.
Justice White's second rationale was the lack of a retribution
justification. He found it unconscionable to treat nontriggermen
and triggermen alike because "[i]t is fundamental that 'causing
harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the
same harm unintentionally.' "183 Relying on noncapital cases, Justice White asserted: "American criminal law has long considered a
defendant's intention - and therefore his moral guilt - to be critical to 'the degree of [his] criminal culpability,' Mullaney v. Wilbur
. . .and the Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitu1 84
tionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing."
Justice White thus concluded that the defendant's punishment was
impermissible because it was not "tailored to his personal responsi85
bility and moral guilt."'
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Solem v.
Helm,' 86 the applicability of eighth amendment disproportionality
analysis' 8 7 to noncapital cases was in doubt. In Rummel v. Estelle, 188
Id. at 799 (quoting in part from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
182 Id. at 799. Justice White relied on the data collected by the ALI and other studies. He also noted that the deterrent effect of the death penalty for vicarious felony
murder was lessened by the infrequency of its application. Id. at 800.
183 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162
181

(1968)).
184 Id. at 800 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)). The Court
cited Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (punishing narcotics addiction
violates eighth amendment) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363 (1910) (in-

validating statute making public official's false entry in public record a crime absent injury or intent to injure).
185

Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.

186 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983).
187 Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974),
formulated a four prong disproportionality test for prison sentences: (1) an examination of the nature of the crime; (2) an examination of the legislative purpose behind the
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five Justices upheld a defendant's life sentence for his third conviction of a nonviolent property crime under a Texas recidivist statute.
The language of the majority opinion gave wide latitude to legislatures in imposing noncapital sentences, based partly upon the
Court's view of the eighth amendment as historically directed at
forms of punishment and not at the "excessiveness" of the
8 9
penalty.1
The holding of Rummel was reaffirmed in Hutto v. Davis, 190
which upheld the imposition of two consecutive twenty year prison
terms and $10,000 fines for two counts of distribution of marijuana
and possession with intent to distribute. The defendant had been in
possession of approximately nine ounces of marijuana. The Court's
brief opinion limited the application of the disproportionality test to
prison sentences involving extreme situations, using the example of
life imprisonment for overtime parking. 19 ' The Hutto Court concluded that "federal courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,' . . . and that 'successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences' should be
'exceedingly rare.' "192 Hutto thus removed any doubt about the
punishment; (3) a comparison of the sentence with punishments in other jurisdictions;
and (4) a comparison of the sentence with other punishments in the same jurisdiction.
Id. at 140-42.
188 445 U.S. 263 (1980). The defendant's three property crimes amounted to $230.
Id. at 265-66.
189
The Court's historical argument is dubious in light of its previous holding in
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Weems Court noted that:
[The eighth amendment's] general language should not. . . be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. . . . [The eighth
amendment is] directed, not only against punishments which inflict torture, "but against all punishments which by their excesssive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."
Id. at 373, 371 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)). The Rummel Court instead concentrated on the form of punishment in Veems,
cadena temporal, as the relevant focus. The Weems Court, however, had noted:
"[Cadena temporal] punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights,
both on account of their degree and kind." Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
The Rummel Court also criticized the disproportionality test's subjectivity, its intrusion on the legislative prerogative to define offenses and fix penalties, and the concerns
with federalism that the test raised in holding state laws unconstitutional. Rummel, 445
U.S. at 281-82.
The illogic of the holding's deference to state legislatures if the penalties are disproportionate is ably demonstrated by Justice Brennan's observation in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring): "Judicial enforcement of the
[eighth amendment] .. .cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason
the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights."
190 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
191 Id. at 374 n.3. The Court in Rummel had used the same extreme example to
illustrate when the eighth amendment might apply to a term of years. 445 U.S. at 274 n.
11.
192 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 (quoting from Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274, 272).
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Court's disapproval of examining prison sentences for "excessiveness" under the eighth amendment, except in extreme cases.193
In Helm, however, the majority explicitly rejected the state's argument that only capital cases were subject to the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 194 The
petitioner in Helm had been sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole after being convicted of his seventh nonviolent felony.' 9 5 In
overturning the sentence, Justice Powell, writing for the five justice
majority, found that "[t]he principle that a punishment should be
proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated
in common-law jurisprudence."' 19 6 After reviewing prior noncapital
cases to which the eighth amendment had been applied, 97 the
Court concluded that "[t]here is no basis for the State's assertion
193
Despite the strong language in Rummel prohibiting a disproportionality analysis,
the Court implicitly used such an analysis to find that Rummel's punishment was not
"grossly disproportionate." Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281. The status of a disproportionality
analysis after Rummel, therefore, was not entirely clear to the lower courts. One court
noted in this regard that
[a]lthough stating that one could argue the proposition that the legislature has absolute discretion to fix the sentence of any felony, the [Rummel] majority did not then adopt it. Instead, without further mention of
the proposition or extreme example, the Court upheld Rummel's sentence because the imposition of a life sentence for the offense involved
served an obvious and substantial state interest and hence was not, in
fact, grossly disproportionate.
Terrebone v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
The case history of Hutto itself shows the reluctance of the lower courts to accept
the full impact of Rummel. The district court in Hutto, relying on Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussed supra note 187), issued a writ of habeas corpus because the 40 year prison sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the possession of
nine ounces of marijuana. Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977). The
Fourth Circuit initially reversed. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1978). After
rehearing the case en banc, however, it affirmed the district court. Davis v. Davis, 601
F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment,
and remanded in light of Rummel. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). The Fourth
Circuit, however, again affirmed the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, finding that
even after Rummel such a disproportionate sentence was not permissible. Davis v. Davis,
646 F.2d 123 (1981). The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed. Hutto
v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
194
Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3003.
195
The petitioner's prior crimes had consisted of three convictions for third degree
burglary, one conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses, one conviction for
grand larceny, and a third offense conviction for driving while intoxicated. All were
nonviolent and in each alcohol had been a contributing factor. 103 S. Ct. at 3004-05.
The conviction which gave rise to the appeal was for utterance of a "no account" check
for $ 100; alcohol was again a contributing factor. Id. at 3005. The petitioner was given
life imprisonment under South Dakota's recidivist statute. S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN.
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). South Dakota makes parole unavailable to an individual sentenced to life imprisonment. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1979).
196 Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3006.
197 Id. at 3008-09. The Court relied on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910). See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down 90 day sentence
for crime of being addicted to narcotics); supra note 189.
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that the general principle of proportionality does not apply to felony
prison sentences. The constitutional language itself suggests no exception for imprisonment...-. There -is also no historical support
for such an exception."' 9 8 The Court-expressly rejected the idea
that Rummel had established ihat prison terms were "purely a matter
of legislative prerogative." ' 199- Instead, the Court instituted a threeprong disproportionality analysis that looked at "objective criteria,"
specifically: "(i) the gravity of,the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed-on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the
20 0
same crime in other jurisdictions."
A strongly worded disseht-found-the majority's "analysis completely at odds with the reasoning of our recent holding in Rummel,
in which, of course, Justice PowELL dissented ' 20 1 Finding no historical or constitutional basis for,the rajotity's disproportionality analysis, the dissent accused the rrjority of overruling legislation they
20 2
disagreed with under the guis ,-of constitutional interpretation.
Helm provides an important link- between- eighth amendment
Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009
"t ,initted).
Id. at 3009 n.14. The Cburt observed,that
[a]ccording to Rummel v. Estelk, "one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this' .'urt-thut for crimes concededly classified
and classifiable as felonies, thai sripjmpishable by significant terms of
imprisonment in a state penite".tiary, the' length of sentence actually imposed is purely a matter' of legislative prerogative ..
." [445 U.S. at
274] (emphasis added), The Court did-not adopt the 8tandard proposed,
but merely recognized that the-argument was possible. To the extent
that the State-or the dissent. . .1.-makes this argument here, we find it
meritless.
Id. See also supra note 193. The'HIlm majority also aktempted to confine Rummel to its
particular facts, arguing:
. o
Contrary to the suggestion in he ilissent. . . our conclusion today is not
inconsistent with Rummel t. Estlle?'Thce Rummel Court recognized-as
does the disseft. .. - that so pesentences of imprisonment are so dis198
199

proportionate that they violate the Eighth Amendment. .

.

. Indeed,

Hutto v. Davis. . . makes clear that Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality review
entesof imprisonment.
i
Rummel did
reject a proportionality challenge.ts5 a p.riicular sentence. But since the
Rummel Court-like the dissent-toda,-offered no standards for determining when an Eighth Amendment vi6lation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar* factual -situatioi.- Here the facts are clearly
distinguishable. Whereas -Rurhsietwas eligible' for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36: was sentbced. to life'with no possibility of parole.
Id. at 3016-17 n.32. See also id. at 30,08-Q9 n.13 (refuting dissent's suggestion that majority ignored principle of stare decisis).
200 Id. at 3011. This is basically' th& same test developed by the Fourth Circuit in
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974), and used by
lower federal courts prior to Rummel. See supiar note 187.
201
Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3017 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justice Powell had "reluctantly" concurred in the Hutto decision. Hutto v.. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
202
103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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disproportionality analysis as developed in Enmund and the felonymurder rule in the non-death penalty context. Helm cited Enmund as
an example of the Court considering "the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty' ' 20 3 to determine the defendant's culpability. The Helm majority stated:
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again clear
distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In Enmund the
Court looked at the petitioner's'lack of interit to kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices .

. .

. Most

would agree that negligent conduct is less serious than intentional
conduct.

20 4

Helm thus extended Enmund's disproportionality analysis, which focused upon the relationship between a defendant's culpability and
his punishment, into the noncapital offense context. 20 5
Even without Helm, however, -the holdings of Rummel and Hutto
did not necessarily diminish. the" significaice of the Enmund Court's
analysis of felony murder. Rummel and .Davis were concerned with
203

Id. at 3010 (citation omitted).

204
205

Id. at 3011.

The Fifth Circuit has adopted-a narrow reading of Enmund, limiting it to cases
where the death penalty is imposed for felgx *-mu dei" and the defendant did not contemplate murder. In Skillern v. Estelle, 720F.2d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1983), the court
stated:
Enmund only prohibits, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the execution of a person for the uncontemplated (Le., personally by him) act of an
accomplice in the course of committing a hon-capital felony upon which
both were engaged. Nothing in Einw'und-otany other decision cited to us
implicates any violation of riglits guaranteed by the- federal constitution
by a state rule ... by which the guilt ofan-accused for an offense committed by a confederate may nevertheless be established ... by his criminal
responsibility for the act or conduct .6f a confederate.
The Fifth Circuit would thus find Enmund's proportionality principles inapplicable to a
guilt finding based on felony murder. Skillern, 720 F.2d at 846.
Such a reading of Enmund, however, fails. to account.for the Helm Court's reliance on
Enmund in a noncapital offense conte),E Moreover, the concepts of "guilt" for an offense and the "penalty" merge at the-poii where aconviction for an offense carries
significantly greater penalties than cQuldotheriWi be imposed; for example, the difference between murder and manslaughter. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
697-98. The felony-murder rule thus directly implicates proportionality principles at
both the guilt and penalty phases by criating.bbth the possibility that the defendant may
be convicted of an otherwise unavailable charge (e.g. first degree murder) and that the
defendant will receive a sigificantlk, harsher sentence.
The Helm Court did observe -in, a footnote that "clearly no sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmtind's crime.", 103 S.Ct. at 3009 n.15. The
comment may have been partly inspired i thef acts of Enmund, because Enmund had
planned the armed robbery. The commeit, even" if intended to cover felony murder
generally, is dicta, and conflicts with the rationale dfEnmund that culpability is the touchstone for imposing punishment. See People v. Dikon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 481-82, 668 P.2d
697, 722-27, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 415-20 (19 3) (relying in part on Enmund to reduce first
degree felony-murder conviction to seconfd degree.-because culpability did not justify
first degree murder).
"
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the proportionality of prison sentences to tjie severity of crimes
which at least contained mens rea elements. In contrast, the Enmund
Court's objection to the severity of the punishment was the absence

of a finding of culpability. The majority's analysis in Enmund relied
on cases not involving the death penalty to establish the proposition
that "American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree
of [his] criminal culpability,' Mullaney v. Wilbur." 20 6 The majority's

objection to imposing severe punishments for unintentional crimes,
therefore, cannot logically be limited to death penalty cases. The
defendant's lack of culpability offends the threshold principles of
our criminal system whether the defendant is sentenced to death or
a term of years. This is the principle that Helm reaffirmed in its discussion of Enmund.20 7 It is defensible, on the other hand, to curtail

review of what term of years is imposed for a crime that can be legitimately punished because a finding of culpability has taken place, as
20 8
in Rummel and Hutto.
The Enmund majority's discussion of culpability, although dealing with a nontriggerman, also extends to those whose actions directly but unintentionally lead to the victim's death. Although it
may be a rare case where a defendant who directly caused the death
of another would not have the requisite culpability to be convicted
of murder, the Court's concern with severe punishment of uninten-

tional crimes applies with equal force whether the defendant's ac20 9
tions or a co-felon's actions directly led to the victim's death.
The necessity of having the factfinder determine culpability exists,
therefore, regardless of how the killing resulted during the commis210
sion of the felony.

206
458 U.S. at 800 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698). See supra notes 183-85 and
accompanying text.
207
Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3011.
208
Furthermore, Justice White's statement in Lockett, 438 U.S. at 627, concerning
the potential problems of imposing punishment without a finding of culpability, supra
note 145, is in accord with the general propositions that he outlined in Enmund.
209
Professor Fletcher, for instance, cites the examples of the "careful arsonist" who
checks the premises carefully but, as he sets the blaze, causes the death of an "independently motivated burglar," and the concerned burglar who tries to calm a surprised occupant with a heart condition, but the occupant dies from shock. Fletcher, supra note 11,
at 414. The actors in both examples caused the death, but lacked the requisite culpability for murder.
210
The dissent in Enmund objected because the majority's "holding interferes with
state criteria for assessing legal guilt by recasting intent as a matter of federal constitutional law." 458 U.S. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). They found the defendant's
culpability to be clear because the defendant admittedly initiated the robbery. Id. at 824
n.40. The dissent, however, acknowledged that mens rea is of some importance to the
penal process, admitting that "while the type of mens rea of the defendant must be considered carefully in assessing the proper penalty, it is not so critical a factor in determining blameworthiness as to require a finding of intent to kill in order to impose the death
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The Enmund majority's finding of the insufficiency of a deterrence rationale also applies to felony murders whether or not the
death penalty is imposed. The data substantiating the infrequency
of killings resulting from felonies did not distinguish between killings where the death penalty applied and killings where it did
not.2 1 ' Indeed, Justice White explained that for deterrence to be
effective the penalty must enter into the defendant's contemplation;
thus, by definition, deterrence is inapplicable whenever an unintentional killing occurs. 2 12 To impose sanctions reserved for intentional, premeditated, or extremely reckless homicides when the
killing may have been accidental or negligent, therefore, has no rational deterrent justification because the defendant never possessed
the state of mind at which the penalties are directed.
An eighth amendment analysis based upon Enmund dictates that
punishment without a legitimate deterrent or retributive rationale
violates the Constitution. The substance of this analysis recently has
been extended by the Court in Helm to embrace noncapital felonies.
The analysis focuses on the illegitimacy of imposing severe punishments where the trier of fact is not required to find culpability that
would justify the sanctions. According to this analysis, the felonymurder rule with its disregard of the defendant's culpability is
invalid.
B.

Due Process Guarantees and Felony Murder

A closely related inquiry to the eighth amendment disproportionality analysis focuses on whether a legislature can impose severe
punishments for nonregulatory crimes that do not have a mens rea
element. Commentators have long criticized the Supreme Court for
not developing a constitutional doctrine requiring culpability before
criminal sanctions can be imposed. 2 13 The Court recently has begun to recognize substantive limits on legislatures' powers to dispose of mens rea elements. 21 4 These limitations suggest that those
penalty for felony murder." Id. at 825. The dissent's objection, therefore, was directed
at the difficulty of implementing an "intent to kill" standard of culpability for the death
penalty, and not at the premise that culpability of some form must be present before
imposing severe punishments.
211 See 458 U.S. at 799 n.23.
212
See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
213
See, e.g., Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107 (1962)
(noting Supreme Court has failed to set adequate standards in considering validity of
strict liability statutes); Saltzman, supra note 5 (urging that Supreme Court reject strict
liability doctrine).
214
The Court has not explicitly elevated these limitations to constitutional status.
Before United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), some commentators argued that no constitutional ban on strict liability crimes existed. See, e.g., Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1573-74. The lower courts and commentators have viewed Gypsum
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courts and legislatures that define felony murder as a distinct crime
without the elements of malice aforethought or premeditation must
either abandon the felony-murder rule or redefine it to contain a
mens rea element.
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 21 5 the Court held that

proof of the defendant's specific intent to fix prices was required for
criminal convictions under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 21 6 The de-

fendant had been convicted through the use of a conclusive presumption that effectively negated any requirement of proof of
intent. 21 7 The Gypsum Court began with "the familiar proposition
that '[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.' ",218 The Court then emphasized its "generally inhospitable
attitude to non-mens rea offenses" 2 19 except in "limited circumstances." 220 These "limited circumstances" were regulatory crimes
where inquiry into intent was unnecessary. 2 2' The Court found that
the situation in Gypsum was not such a limited circumstance and expressed concern that the severe punishments of the Sherman Act
were being used "not to punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing at odds with statutory proscriptions, but instead simply to regulate business practices regardless of the intent with which they were
undertaken."

2 22

The Gypsum Court based its reasoning primarily on Morissette v.
United States,2 23 in which the Court had first expressly articulated the
importance of mens rea to our system of criminal law:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
and subsequent cases, however, as establishing an emerging constitutional doctrine of
mens rea. See Erlinder, Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional
Doctrine of Substantive CriminalLaw, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163, 174 (1981); see also People v.
Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 497 n.3, 668 P.2d 697, 733 n.3, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 426 n.3
(1983) (Bird, CJ., concurring) (arguing that there should be constitutional requirement
of mens rea for homicide in felony-murder cases).
215
438 U.S. 422 (1978).
216 Id. at 443.
217
The presumption provided that the defendant's wrongful intent was established
by proof of the prohibited act of affecting prices. Id. at 446.
218 Id. at 436 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
219
Id. at 438. The Court cited W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 69, and MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.05 (Tent. Draft 1953), both of which favor limiting strict liability crimes
to offenses which neither involve imprisonment nor carry the consequences associated
with a criminal conviction. See W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 69, at 222-23.
220
438 U.S. at 437.
221
Id.at440-41.
222
Id. at 442 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 492 n.18.
223
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation
between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act
is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I
didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy
and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in
place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
22 4
prosecution.
Although Morissette did not directly address the limits on the legislature's power, the Court limited its approval of previous cases allowing strict liability offenses to " 'legislation whereby penalties
serve as effective means of regulation.' "225
The cases cited in Gypsum support the principle that the legislature's power to eliminate a mens rea element is limited to the public
welfare regulatory context. 22 6 Each of the cases cited involved a
regulatory crime not recognized at the common law, 2 27 a distinction
which the Court had noted. 22 8 Furthermore, even these "strict liability" cases retained some notion of culpability because they dealt
with activities of an inherently dangerous nature, which would put
the defendant on notice that his conduct was prohibited. 2 29 For example, in Lambert v. California,23 0 the Court overturned a conviction
224
Id. at 250-51. The Court in Morissette held that courts should not read the element of intent out of legislation, at least for "offenses incorporated from the common
law." Id. at 262.
225
Id. at 259-60 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81
(1943)); see also Erlinder, supra note 214, at 176 n.90.
226
438 U.S. at 437. The Court stated in full: "While strict-liability offenses are not
unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements, the
limited circumstances in which Congress has created and this Court has recognized such
offenses attest to their generally disfavored status." Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court's reference to constitutional requirements in discussing the
previous cases buttresses the argument that the Constitution limits a legislature's power
to omit a mens rea element for nonregulatory crimes.
227
See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (possession of unregistered hand
grenades); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipping of adulterated
drugs in violation of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); United States v. Behrman,
258 U.S. 280 (1922) (companion case to Balint); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250
(1922) (Narcotics Act of 1914 requiring that certain drugs be registered before being
sold); and Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (violation of terms of
permit to do business in state).
228
The Court in Balint explicitly distinguished between regulatory measures and malure in se crimes. 258 U.S. at 252. See also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (distinguishing between regulatory measures and crimes borrowed from common law).
229
The Court in Balint noted that it was dealing with cases where the defendant's
"mere negligence may be dangerous to [the public], as in selling diseased food or
poison." 258 U.S. at 252. See also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607. See generally
Erlinder, supra note 214, at 182-84.
Shevlin is the only case cited by the Gypsum court which does not deal with inherently
dangerous activities. In Shevlin, the corporation's logging activities violated the terms of
their permit to do business within the state. Yet, even in Sheulin the Court observed that
the company knowingly violated the permit's terms. 218 U.S. at 69.
230 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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for failing to abide by a city ordinance requiring convicted felons to
register with the city because it was not the type of activity that
would "alert the doer to the consequences of his deed." 2 3 , Thus,
the Gypsum Court's approval of prior cases that allowed the strict
liability standard for regulatory crimes did not detract from the
Court's holding that mens rea is a requirement outside the regula2 32
tory context.
In several cases subsequent to Gypsum, the Court has required a
finding of culpability for nonregulatory crimes. The Court in Colautti v. Franklin 233 struck down on vagueness grounds a statute that
imposed criminal and civil liability for physicians who performed
abortions on viable fetuses or on fetuses that the physician had reason to believe were viable. The Court noted that the statute's
vagueness problems were exacerbated by the fact that the physician
could be convicted "without regard to fault." 2 34 The Court also observed that "the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement
of mens rea."

2 35

In United States v. Bailey, 236 justice Rehnquist suggested that certain crimes, including murder, are distinguishable from other crimes
because of the necessity of finding culpability:
In certain narrow classes of crimes, however, heightened culpability has been thought to merit special attention. Thus, the
statutory and common law of homicide often distinguishes, either
in setting the "degree" of the crime or in imposing punishment,
between a person who knows that another person will be killed as
the result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific
purpose of taking another's life. Similarly, where a defendant is
charged with treason, this Court has stated that the Government
must demonstrate that the defendant acted with a purpose to aid
the enemy. Another such example is the law of inchoate offenses
231
232

Id. at 228.
Prior to Gypsum, Professor Saltzman viewed Shevlin, Balint, Behrman, Dotterweich,

and Freed as establishing few, if any, substantive limits on strict liability offenses. Saltzman, supra note 5, at 1592-1615. Professor Erlinder, in contrast, reads the cases in light
of Gypsum as allowing legislatures to dispose of a mens rea element in very limited situations. Erlinder, supra note 214, at 179-83. Erlinder suggests that the strict liability cases,
if read closely, "actually required (1) proof that defendants purposely or knowingly sold
or possessed certain items and (2) that defendants knew what the items were." Id. at
186; see also Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 5, at 1374-76.
233 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
234
Id. at 394.
235
Id. at 395. Professor Erlinder concludes that "[t]he plain implication of Colautti is
that mens rea as an element of crime is closely related to due process doctrine either as an
independent doctrine or as an appendage to vagueness analysis." Erlinder, supra note
214, at 178.
236 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
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such as attempt and conspiracy, where a heightened mental state
237
separates criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior.
Justice Rehnquist further noted that " 'strict liability' crimes are exceptions to the general rule that criminal liability requires an 'evilmeaning mind,' "238 and quoted the Model Penal Code for the
proposition that " 'clear analysis requires that the question of the
kind of culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately with respect to each material element of
the crime.' "239
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the Model Penal Code as a
guideline for analyzing culpability 240 has been read by one commentator as establishing a constitutional doctrine of mens rea against
which legislation must be tested. 2 4 1 AlthoughJustice Rehnquist disclaimed any controlling effect of the Model Penal Code's culpability
standards and cautioned against "hair-splitting distinctions," 24 2 Bailey at a minimum establishes that culpability analysis is the starting
point in reviewing legislation. 24 3 Furthermore, it is arguable in light
of Justice Rehnquist's earlier comments that certain crimes might
require "heightened culpability," that the opinion stands for the
24 4
proposition that certain crimes must contain a mens rea element.
Morissette, Gypsum and subsequent cases thus establish that a
state's power to define strict liability crimes is limited, notwithstandId. at 405 (citations omitted).
Id. at 404 n.4.
239 Id. at 406 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (1)(a)
posed Official Draft 1962)).
237
238

240

commentary at 33 (Pro-

Id. at 403-04.

241 Erlinder, supra note 214, at 188.
242 444 U.S. at 406-07. Further caution in reading Bailey too broadly is warranted in
light ofJustice Rehnquist's dissent in Gypsum:
The portions of [the majority's opinion] which I find most troubling are
not those which expressly address the congressionally prescribed requirement of intent for criminal liability under the Sherman Act, but
those which discourse at length upon the role of intent in the imposition
of criminal liability in general, particularly those which might be taken to
import any special constitutional difficulty if criminal liability is imposed
without fault. While the Court emphasizes that its result is not constitutionally required, ante, at 437, the Court's broad policy statements may
be misread by the lower courts. I also feel bound to say that while I am
willing to respectfully defer to the views of the distinguished authors of
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, and to the authors of law
review articles and treatises such as those sprinkled throughout the text
of Part II of the Court's opinion, I have serious reservations about the
undiscriminating emphasis and weight which the Court appears to give
them in this case.
438 U.S. at 473 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is intriguing
in light of his comments in Gypsum that Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on the Model
Penal Code in his Bailey opinion.
243
Erlinder, supra note 214, at 189.
244
Id.
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ing Pattersonv. New York's broad mandate. 24 5 Although the limits are
not precisely defined, they preclude the imposition of significant
punishments for nonregulatory crimes unless the state has made a
showing of the defendant's culpability. When the felony-murder
rule is judged against this constitutional standard, its legitimacy
again is cast into doubt.
C.

Summary: The Felony-Murder Rule as a Strict Liability
Offense and Constitutional Guarantees

Courts that conceptualize the felony-murder rule as imposing
strict liability on the defendant for a homicide solely because it occurred in the course of a felony24 6 violate the principles set forth in
Enmund and Gypsum. If the killing was accidental, convicting and
punishing the defendant for murder violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against disproportionate punishments. As the
Enmund majority observed, "[i]t is fundamental [in American criminal law] that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' ",247 Moreover,
the felony-murder rule serves neither the deterrent nor retributive
purposes that Enmund required before punishment could be
248
imposed.
Even if the felony-murder rule is envisioned as a "package,"
with the intent to commit the felony evidencing sufficient culpability
for holding the felon responsible for the homicide, 2 49 the rule embodies constitutionally impermissible strict liability principles. The
rule excuses the state from proving the defendant's culpability for
murder, although a mens rea element is formally retained, and thus
effectively eliminates the mens rea requirement in the same sense
that the presumptions in Morissette and Sandstrom operated to eliminate the element of intent. 2 50 Furthermore, as the Model Penal
Code language quoted by Justice Rehnquist in Bailey makes clear, it
245
246
247

See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
458 U.S. at 798 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBLITY 162 (1968)).
248
See supra notes 181-85, 209-12 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 75.
250 E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75 (1952) ("A conclusive
presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as
an ingredient of the offense.") In People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194
Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983), ChiefJustice Bird of the California Supreme Court in her concurrence expressed the view that "[the rule's] continued application would impermissibly
conflict with a constitutional requirement of mens rea." Id. at 497, 668 P.2d at 733, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 426. ChiefJustice Bird also recognized that the felony-murder rule in reality "punishe[s] . . .the commission of the underlying felony," and as such is a strict
liability crime that violates the proportionality principles embodied in the eighth amendment. Id. at 498, 668 P.2d at 734, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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is necessary to distinguish between the culpability required for the
different elements of a crime. 25 1 The felony-murder rule, however,
violates this principle, as it fails to distinguish between the mens rea
required for murder and the intent to commit a felony.
Requiring proof of culpability for the separate act of killing may
not change the result in many cases. If a defendant undertakes a
dangerous felony, he probably has exhibited the extreme reckless2 52
ness or malice aforethought necessary for a conviction of murder.
Our criminal system, however, has evolved to a point where
probability or general evil intent alone will not justify legal shortcuts to a conviction for murder. As the concurring opinion in People
v. Aaron, the case in which the Michigan Supreme Court abandoned
the felony-murder rule, aptly stated:
The basic infirmity of feleny-murder lies in its failure to correlate,
to any degree, criminal liability with moral culpability. It permits
one to be punished for a killing, usually with the most severe penalty in the law, without requiring proof of any mental state with
respect to the killing. This incongruity is simply more than we are
25 3
willing to permit our criminal jurisprudence to bear.

Gypsum now provides the constitutional basis for implementing this
basic principle. Legislatures and courts may not create or sanction
nonregulatory crimes without a finding of culpability for each element of the crime. When viewed as a distinct offense, felony murder inescapably runs afoul of this principle.
CONCLUSION

The felony-murder rule has been criticized almost from its inception as a harsh legal doctrine with insufficient policy justifications. Two basic conceptualizations of felony murder have
emerged: the rule is viewed either as providing a conclusive presumption of the culpability required for murder, or as a distinct
crime for which the killing does not have a separate mens rea element apart from the felony.
The Supreme Court's holding in Sandstrom v. Montana constitutionally prohibits conclusive presumptions because they violate a
defendant's presumption of innocence and because they intrude
upon the jury's duty to affirmatively find each element of the offense. The felony-murder rule violates both rationales of Sandstrom
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
Most critics of the felony-murder rule conclude that abolishing the rule will not
affect a substantial number of cases. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at
37 (Official Draft 1980); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304, 327 (1980);
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 5, at 1385.
253
409 Mich. at 744, 299 N.W.2d at 334.
251
252
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when it operates as a conclusive presumption of the defendant's
culpability for murder. The Model Penal Code's rebuttable presumption also fails to resolve the constitutional infirmity of the rule.
The operative effect of the Code's presumption is that of a
mandatory presumption, and as such, it does not meet the criteria of
either Ulster County Court v. Allen or Sandstrom.
Those courts that have attempted to avoid the due process
problems of mandatory presumptions have characterized the felonymurder rule as a distinct crime without a separate mens rea element
for the homicide. The Supreme Court has recently indicated, however, that eighth amendment and due process restrictions limit the
ability of legislatures and courts to create and sanction nonregulatory crimes that do not contain a requirement of culpability. In
Enmund v. Florida and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., the
Court has noted that a relationship between culpability and punishment is intrinsic to our criminal system. The felony-murder rule violates this basic principle of our legal system when justified as a
strict liability crime.
The felony-murder rule arose from obscure historical origins
and has developed haphazardly into a harsh and unjust legal doctrine. It is perhaps fitting, therefore, that two separate lines of constitutional doctrines, developing independently, have come together
in such a way that it is impossible to conceptualize felony murder in
a manner that does not run afoul of constitutional guarantees.
Courts and commentators have extensively documented the rule's
weak policy justifications. This Article has demonstrated that the
rule's infirmities have finally reached constitutional stature.

